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[Australian copyright law is poised on the brink of major change. Even before a finalised test case of 
the Digital Agenda Amendments, Australia had committed to a wholesale rewrite of those reforms 
under the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement. This article falls broadly into two parts. 
Part II examines the intellectual property laws relating to digital rights management technologies. It 
explores the history of so-called ‘anti-circumvention’ laws nationally and internationally, as well as 
important precedents. Part III examines whether Australian competition law is equipped to address 
any anti-competitive conduct facilitated by technological protection measures, which can be used to 
lock in consumers and lock out competitors. Important US precedents including Lexmark 
International Inc v Static Control Components Inc and Chamberlain Group Inc v Skylink 
Technologies Inc are analysed under Australian law, both before and after the full implementation of 
the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, including an examination of relevant provisions 
of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), especially the intellectual property exception in 
s 51(3).] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
The debate over the underlying policy objectives of intellectual property (‘IP’) 
law and competition law (and, indeed, the appropriate relationship or ‘interface’ 
between the two) has a long history. In the middle of the 20th century, the 
Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter, recognised the important 
pro-competitive effects of invention and innovation. He described competition in 
terms of a dynamic process of rivalry in which entrepreneurs and innovators 
constantly seek to discover new profit opportunities. This dynamic competition 
for profits produces ‘the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of 
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supply, the new type of organisation’.1 All firms are subject to a ‘perennial gale 
of creative destruction’2 in which new markets are created and old ones are 
destroyed. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, this process of ‘creative destruction’ has 
increased dramatically. Invention and innovation are increasingly driving the 
so-called ‘new’ economy. New and better high technology products are 
constantly being released in areas as diverse as entertainment, 
telecommunications, media, computers and health care. These new technologies 
displace successful incumbents. Competition in the new economy is being driven 
by a ‘winner takes all’ game to capture the ‘transient monopolies’ that are 
necessary to provide incentives to make investments.3 
IP laws have a crucial role to play in this process as they are necessary to 
prevent market failure arising from ‘free-riding’ (copying by others without 
payment).4 Invention and innovation have the properties of a ‘public good’: once 
they are in the public domain it is difficult to prevent their use by others unless 
they are protected by IP laws. Without some form of statutory protection there 
would be little or no incentive to innovate. 
The exclusive property rights granted by IP statutes were once regarded with a 
high degree of suspicion by regulators entrusted with the enforcement of 
competition laws. However, their role is now better understood and they are 
seen, for the most part, as pro-competitive.5 
First, IP rights provide their owners with limited monopoly rights which they 
themselves can exploit through manufacture and marketing or through licensing 
others to do so. These limited monopoly rights serve as an incentive to innovate 
— innovation is the process by which new products are developed based on 
inventions. Second, licensing is often the best way of ensuring that IP rights find 
their way into the hands of the most efficient producers and distributors so that 
the final products incorporating the IP rights can be produced and distributed 
most efficiently. 
This article is concerned with amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
which provide for technological protection measures (‘TPMs’). While the 
underlying policy objective to prevent copying can be justified as 
pro-competitive, we believe that TPMs may be used for anti-competitive 
purposes. They can deny access to copyright, as well as prevent copying, and 
 
 1 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (5th ed, 1976) 87. 
 2 Ibid. 
 3 See Richard A Posner, ‘Antitrust in the New Economy’ (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 925. 
 4 See Henry Ergas, ‘Intellectual Property and Competition’ (Paper presented at the Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice Hearings on Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Washington, DC, 23 May 2002) 2–11 <http://www. 
cccp.anu.edu.au/publications/FTC-DOJ_23May02_IPCompAus_v06.pdf>, on the economic 
characteristics of IP and the social benefit that is produced by ‘competition through innovation’. 
 5 See Herbert J Hovenkamp, ‘IP and Antitrust Policy: A Brief Historical Overview’ (Research 
Paper No 05-31, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2005) <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
869417>; F M Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 
(3rd ed, 1990) 613–60; William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law (2003) 334–53; Aspen Publishers, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, vols 1–2 (2005 Supplement). For an 
EU competition law perspective, see Valentine Korah, ‘The Interface between Intellectual 
Property and Antitrust: The European Experience’ (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 801. 
     
660 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 30 
     
thereby prevent interoperability with other products. In this way, markets can be 
protected from competition and market power can be lifted from one market to 
another in an anti-competitive way. This article explains how TPMs can be used 
in an anti-competitive manner and considers whether the competition provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’) are adequate to deal with the 
problem. 
II   DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND THE LAW  
A  Overview 
1 The Origins of DRM 
All analogue technologies, such as audio tapes, video cassette recorders 
(‘VCRs’), vinyl records and printed books, suffer from a common flaw — only 
imperfect copying of analogue material is possible. Such copying necessarily 
involves a loss of quality, the effect of which is cumulative — a copy of a copy 
of a copy of analogue material is often of such a low quality that it is unsuitable 
for many purposes. This effect has acted as a natural disincentive to wide scale 
copying of material that infringes copyright. Nevertheless, large copyright 
holders greeted new developments in analogue technology (including cable 
television, audio tapes and VCRs) with trepidation. Amid predictions of market 
destruction and bankruptcy in the entertainment industries, early attempts by 
copyright lobbyists to secure legislative protection, or to suppress new 
technologies through litigation,6 typically failed. 
As a result, copyright holders turned to self-help, in the form of embryonic 
‘rights management’ methods more commonly known (at the time) as 
‘copy-protection’. Copy-protection typically operated by attempting to degrade 
artificially the quality of any copies made. However, copy-protection had no 
legal protection and could be freely circumvented. 
Digital technologies,7 unlike analogue, allow perfect reproduction of material. 
In a digital environment, a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy is identical to the 
original, and digital information is ideally suited for transmission over long 
distances with no loss of quality. 
In the early 1980s, the spread of digital technology into the home 
entertainment market caused even greater concern to copyright holders. Over 
time, methods of technological self-help evolved into what is now known as 
digital rights management (‘DRM’). Paradoxically, while the digital environment 
is more susceptible to infringing copying and distribution of copyright material, 
it also has a much greater potential to prevent such infringing activity. This is 
because digital technology lends itself to the creation and enforcement of 
sophisticated DRM systems, which, using encryption and other means, control 
not only potentially infringing copying of material, but also access to the 
material itself. 
 
 6 See generally Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios Inc, 464 US 417 (1984) 
(‘Betamax Case’); CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc [1988] AC 1013, 
involving twin deck audio tape recorders. 
 7 For example, compact discs (‘CDs’), digital video discs or digital versatile discs (‘DVDs’), 
personal computer (‘PC’) files and networking, digital audio tapes (‘DATs’) and minidiscs. 
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Initially, these DRM systems did not enjoy any legal status or protection. 
Arguing that ‘digital is different’, groups representing the interests of copyright 
holders lobbied at both national and international levels for legal protection of 
their DRM systems to prevent ‘piracy’ allegedly facilitated by the digital 
revolution.8 Such lobbying was partially successful. In 1992, the United States 
passed the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (‘AHRA’),9 which required all 
digital audio recording devices manufactured, imported or distributed within the 
United States to use a DRM system known as the ‘Serial Copy Management 
System’.10 This primarily affected the then newly released DAT and minidisc 
formats, which, as it turned out, were less than commercially successful — 
possibly due in part to consumer dissatisfaction with the restrictive Serial Copy 
Management System they were required to contain. 
In markets, DRM technology effectively creates a technology bottleneck that 
resembles an ‘essential facility’. By denying access to the DRM technology the 
owner can effectively preclude competition in dependent markets.11 
Anti-circumvention laws therefore give copyright owners the legal power to 
create closed technology platforms which exclude competitors from 
interoperating with them. 
To illustrate the nature of the problem, consider that DRM technology is used 
in connection with music sold over the internet. The major record companies are 
the owners of the copyright in the music.12 They agree to allow the music to be 
sold only on the condition that the downloaded music is protected by a DRM 
technology. The music can be played on a buyer’s PC, but only using software 
produced by licensees of the DRM technology. Other software will be unable to 
read or play the downloaded music files. Likewise, if the buyer wishes to use the 
songs on a portable player such as a Walkman or iPod, they can only do so using 
a portable player which implements the DRM technology. Competition in the 
downstream market for compatible portable players and PC software is 
precluded.13 
DRM technology can thus be seen to lock in the consumer who downloads 
music under one DRM technology to using a portable player (such as an iPod) 
which employs a compatible DRM technology. Simultaneously, it can be seen to 
 
 8 See Submission to House of Representatives Standing Committee for Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999, 
7 October 1999, Submission No 59, 2 (International Intellectual Property Alliance). 
 9 Pub L No 102-563, 106 Stat 4237. 
 10 17 USC § 1002(a) (2000 & Supp IV, 2004). 
 11 A dependent market is one in which it is necessary for a product to have access to the TPM 
before it is able to compete successfully in the market — for example, the market for 
DRM-protected music playable on Apple iPod devices, or the market for portable players (such 
as iPods) that are compatible with music purchased from the Apple iTunes Music Store. Both of 
these markets are dependent on access to the Apple iTunes DRM technology (known as 
‘FairPlay’). 
 12 Technically, copyright subsists in the sound recordings and in the underlying music and lyrics. 
 13 See the decision of the French competition authority, the Conseil de la Concurrence, in the case 
brought by VirginMega, a subsidiary of the Virgin Group, against Apple Computer France: 
Conseil de la Concurrence, Décision No 04-D-54 du 9 novembre 2004 relative à des pratiques 
mises en oeuvre par la société Apple Computer Inc dans les secteurs du téléchargement de 
musique sur Internet et des baladeurs numériques (2004) (‘VirginMega Case’) <http://www. 
conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d54.pdf>. 
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lock out competitors who cannot get a licence for the use of the DRM 
technology to produce competing compatible products. 
This means that a consumer must buy a multitude of different devices, each 
supporting different but incompatible standards and DRM technologies, or resort 
to a potentially illegal circumvention of the DRM to ‘format-shift’ their legally 
purchased content.14 
2 DRM and Business Models 
Taking console games platforms (such as the Sony PlayStation, or the 
Microsoft Xbox) as an example, it is likely that the use of DRM systems in such 
platforms is motivated by more than merely a desire to prevent or deter the 
infringement of copyright. Peter L Higgs identifies three motives: 
• to prevent the unauthorised manufacture or casual duplication by others of 
software that the company has the rights to publish and to distribute; 
• to ensure that hardware produced by the company can only run software 
authorised or published by the company; and 
• to enforce distribution channel and format segmentation strategies.15 
To this list can be added: 
• to ensure that software designed to be used on hardware produced by the 
company can only be used on hardware produced by the company. This 
creates a platform lock-in by imposing significant ‘switching costs’ upon 
users — a user with a significant investment in games in a format compatible 
with Platform A would have to repurchase those games in a format 
compatible with Platform B in order to switch platforms;16 
• to restrict or prohibit the resale or transfer of legitimately manufactured and 
purchased software after their initial purchase. Such controls contribute 
significantly to platform lock-in because they raise switching costs — if a 
user cannot resell or transfer their purchased software, switching platforms 
would require them to write off their investment in that software; 
• to prevent arbitrage and facilitate geographical price discrimination — that is, 
selling products at different price points in different countries. Apple 
Computer Inc is currently under investigation by the European Commission 
for alleged violations of EU competition law for engaging in such conduct;17 
 
 14 On 14 May 2006, the Attorney-General announced that a new ‘format-shifting’ exception to 
copyright would be created. However, at this stage, it seems that the exception will not apply 
where the copyright material is protected by DRM. See Phillip Ruddock, Attorney-General, 
‘Major Copyright Reforms Strike Balance’ (Press Release, 14 May 2006). 
 15 Peter L Higgs, Understanding the Business Models Driving Manufacturer’s ‘Technological 
Protection Measures’ (2003) available at CCI: ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries 
and Innovation (28 November 2006) <http://wiki.cci.edu.au>. 
 16 This is essentially a counterpart to the ‘publishing controls’ identified by Higgs. 
 17 Apple Computer Inc, Form 10-K: Apple Inc — AAPL: Annual Report Which Provides a 
Comprehensive Overview of the Company for the Last Year (2006) 39 <http://ccbn.10kwizard. 
com/xml/download.php?repo=tenk&ipage=4566832&format=PDF>. Apple prevents iTunes 
Music Store customers located in the UK from purchasing music at cheaper prices from the 
iTunes Music Stores in other EU countries. 
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• to restrict or prevent the production of ‘unauthorised’ accessories — that is, 
third-party add-ons or other products which must interoperate with 
company-produced ‘authorised’ hardware and/or software; and 
• to restrict or prevent a company’s products from being serviced by 
‘unauthorised’ service agents. 
While the first of these motives (preventing infringing copying) is relatively 
uncontroversial,18 the use of DRM to create and enforce the other controls 
identified above has been widely condemned,19 and has been the subject of 
recent litigation in the United States.20 
B  The History of Anti-Circumvention Laws 
1 The WIPO ‘Internet Treaties’ 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty21 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty22 resulted from the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization 
(‘WIPO’) Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Related Rights 
Questions. They took effect in 2002 after each received the required 30 country 
notifications.23 Collectively and informally known as the ‘Internet Treaties’, the 
WCT and WPPT constitute the first international attempt to prescribe minimum 
standards of legal protection for DRM technologies. Their approach differs from 
that of the AHRA, in that they seek to prevent the circumvention of DRM 
systems, not mandate the inclusion of DRM in particular classes of technology. 
Article 11 of the WCT provides: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are 
used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty 
or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which 
are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.24 
The terms of this provision are quite broad and leave substantial latitude to 
states in their implementation of the provision. The term ‘effective technological 
measures’ is not further defined, creating some uncertainty. 
Notably, the Internet Treaties only require that adequate protection and 
effective remedies be provided against ‘the circumvention of effective 
technological measures’ — that is, the act of circumvention itself. Strictly 
 
 18 The use of DRM to restrict copying is not above criticism: while it prevents infringing copying, 
it also prevents copying that would not infringe copyright, such as fair dealing and making 
backup copies of computer software. 
 19 See, eg, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years under the 
DMCA (2006) <http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf>. 
 20 See further below Part II(E). 
 21 Opened for signature 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65 (entered into force 6 March 2002) (‘WCT’). 
 22 Opened for signature 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 76 (entered into force 20 May 2002) 
(‘WPPT’). 
 23 WIPO, Treaties and Contracting Parties: Summary of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/summary_wct.html>; WIPO, Treaties and Contracting 
Parties: Summary of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (1996) 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/summary_wppt.html>. 
 24 Article 18 of the WPPT contains a similar section, but deals only with the rights of performers 
and producers of sound recordings rather than copyrighted works generally. 
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construed, the Internet Treaties do not require restrictions on devices and 
technology which might be used to perform the circumvention. 
2 The DMCA 
The US implemented art 11 of the WCT by amendments contained in Title I of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (‘DMCA’).25 Subject to narrow 
exceptions, the amendments prohibit the circumvention of ‘a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title’,26 
and commercial dealings with tools capable of circumventing protection 
measures (‘circumvention devices’).27 
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA arguably go beyond the 
requirements of the Internet Treaties.28 Some commentators have suggested that 
US copyright lobbyists sought the implementation of a stronger level of 
protection in the hope that other countries would model their implementation of 
the Internet Treaties on the DMCA.29 
3 Digital Agenda Amendments 
Australia’s decision in mid-1998 to relax controls on parallel importation30 did 
not go unnoticed by the US, and attracted significant criticism. Australia’s 
system of IP protections, which had been described by the US from 1995 to 1998 
as providing, ‘[w]ith a few exceptions … world class intellectual property 
protection’31 was described in 2000 as providing merely ‘[i]n general … sound 
intellectual property protection’.32 
The US was also ‘concerned with the recent Australian minimalist approach 
towards intellectual property protection in several important areas’ and ‘made 
these concerns known to the Australian Government on numerous occasions.’33 
During the 1990s, the US placed Australia on a statutory ‘watch list’ of 
countries with inadequate protection for IP rights in eight out of 10 years,34 
because of concerns over Australia’s plan to remove controls on parallel 
importation.35 
 
 25 17 USC §§ 1201–5 (1998). 
 26 DMCA, 17 USC § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1998). 
 27 DMCA, 17 USC § 1201(a)(2) (1998). 
 28 Pamela Samuelson, ‘Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 519, 521; Dan L Burk, ‘Anti-Circumvention Misuse’ (Research Paper No 02-10, 
University of Minnesota Law School, 2002) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=320961>. 
 29 Herbert J Hammond et al, ‘The Anti-Circumvention Provision of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’ (2002) 8 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 593, 595. 
 30 See Copyright Amendment Act [No 1] 1998 (Cth); Copyright Amendment Act [No 2] 1998 (Cth). 
 31 See, eg, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1997 National Trade Estimate Report 
on Foreign Trade Barriers (1997) 17; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1998 
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (1998) 16. 
 32 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2000 National Trade Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers (2000) 12. 
 33 Ibid. 
 34 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2004 Special 301 Report on Global Copyright 
Protection and Enforcement (2004) app D <http://www.iipa.com/special301_TOCs/2004_SPEC 
301_TOC.html>. 
 35 Ibid app E. 
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Australia participated in the drafting of the WIPO Internet Treaties, but is not 
yet a signatory to them.36 Nonetheless, the Australian Government legislated to 
implement the Internet Treaties to bring Australian copyright law into the 21st 
century and maintain the balance between the rights of copyright owners and 
copyright users in the digital environment.37 The Copyright Amendment (Digital 
Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) (‘Digital Agenda Amendments’) was an independent 
implementation of the Internet Treaties, one which adhered more closely to the 
letter of the Internet Treaties than the DMCA. 
This departure from the ‘precedent’ of the DMCA generated significant 
controversy amongst copyright holders. The US reported that ‘US copyright 
interests have stressed deep concern about the [draft] digital agenda legislation’38 
and that 
[t]he [copyright] industry is concerned that the legislation … would allow for 
unfettered worldwide trafficking in devices and services aimed at hacking 
through encryption, password protection and other technologies copyright 
owners use to manage access to and use of their works.39 
On the issue of TPMs, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs’ Advisory Report on the Copyright Amendment 
(Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 observed: 
At their most extreme positions, the copyright owners wish to manage all 
access to copyrighted material, both lawful and unlawful, apart from access for 
a few enumerated, legitimate purposes. Conversely, the copyright users wish to 
have uncontrolled access to all copyrighted material, and leave the copyright 
owners to obtain redress for any consequent infringement of their copyright 
through infringement actions.40 
The Digital Agenda Amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) define a 
‘technological protection measure’ as: 
a device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that is 
designed, in the ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the 
infringement of copyright in a work or other subject-matter by either or both of 
the following means: 
(a) by ensuring that access to the work or other subject matter is available 
solely by use of an access code or process (including decryption, 
unscrambling or other transformation of the work or other 
subject-matter) with the authority of the owner or licensee of the 
copyright; 
 
 36 The AUSFTA requires Australia to accede to the Internet Treaties by 1 January 2007: AUSFTA, 
opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.12 (entered into force 1 January 2005). 
 37 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 August 2000, 16 245 (Senator Ian 
Campbell). 
 38 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2000 National Trade Estimate Report, 
above n 32, 13. 
 39 Ibid. 
 40 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament 
of Australia, Advisory Report on Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (1999) 63–4. 
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(b) through a copy control mechanism.41 
The Act then defines a ‘circumvention device’ as: 
a device (including a computer program) having only a limited commercially 
significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the 
circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an [sic] technological 
protection measure.42 
Subject to narrow exceptions (which are nonetheless broader than those 
contained in the DMCA), the Digital Agenda Amendments prohibit a wide range 
of dealings with circumvention devices.43 However, unlike the DMCA, the 
amendments do not prohibit the use of a circumvention device. The 
Government’s rationale for banning the manufacture of, and commercial 
dealings with, circumvention devices (as opposed to their use) was that ‘the most 
significant threat to copyright owners’ rights lies in preparatory acts for 
circumvention, such as manufacture, importation, making available online and 
sale of devices, rather than individual acts of circumvention.’44 
The exceptions allowed by the Digital Agenda Amendments do not include 
many existing exceptions to copyright generally, such as fair dealing, and 
making backup copies of computer software. 
C  Stevens v Sony 
The Digital Agenda Amendments’ anti-circumvention provisions were 
considered by the High Court in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer 
Entertainment.45 
1 First Instance 
Sony PlayStation games consoles contained a proprietary DRM system 
developed by Sony. Similar to the region-coding system for DVDs, PlayStations 
were programmed on a regional basis such that a PlayStation console in one 
region would not play PlayStation games from any other region. Genuine 
PlayStation discs contained an ‘access code’ which corresponded to the 
geographical area in which the disc was intended to be used. The access code 
was embedded in the disc in such a way that any attempt to copy the disc (that is, 
the PlayStation game and the associated access code) would result in the game 
being copied, but not the access code. 
 
 41 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) (emphasis added), as amended by Digital Agenda Amendments 
sch 1 item 15B. 
 42 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1), as amended by Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) 
Act 2003 (Cth) sch 1 item 1. Due to a drafting oversight, the original amendments introduced by 
Digital Agenda Amendments sch 1 item 5 used the term ‘an effective technological protection 
measure’ instead of ‘a technological protection measure’. The definition was amended to omit 
the word ‘effective’ by the Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Act 2003 (Cth) sch 1 
item 1. 
 43 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116A. For an explanation of the prohibited dealings, see below n 47. 
 44 Submission to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999, 
Undated, Submission No 75, 20 (Attorney-General’s Department and Department of 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts). 
 45 (2005) 224 CLR 193 (‘Stevens v Sony’). 
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When a disc was inserted into a PlayStation console, the console checked for 
the presence of the access code on the disc, and unless the disc contained an 
access code which matched the region-coding of the console, the console would 
refuse to play the disc. 
The effect of this system was twofold. First, copies — including backup copies 
legally made under Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47C — of PlayStation games 
would not work on an unmodified PlayStation console, because they lacked the 
necessary access code. Second, original PlayStation games which were imported 
from overseas would not work on an unmodified PlayStation console, because 
the access code they contained was from the wrong geographical area. 
Eddy Stevens sold and installed so-called ‘mod chips’ which modified 
PlayStation consoles so they would play games without requiring the presence of 
the correct access code on the disc. A group of Sony corporations filed suit 
against Stevens in 2001,46 alleging inter alia that he had unlawfully sold 
circumvention devices contrary to s 116A of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).47 
Whether the mod chips were a circumvention device turned upon whether 
Sony’s access code DRM system was a TPM within the meaning of s 10(1) of 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
At first instance, Sackville J held that because the access code DRM did not 
prevent the making of a copy of a PlayStation game (which would infringe the 
copyright subsisting in the game as a computer program), but instead rendered 
the copy unusable on an unmodified PlayStation, the DRM was designed merely 
to deter or discourage the infringement of copyright in PlayStation games, not 
prevent it.48 On this construction, the access code DRM system did not constitute 
a ‘technological protection measure’ within s 10(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth). 
Sony submitted that the definition of ‘technological protection measure’ 
should be construed broadly so as to include a device which had the practical 
effect of discouraging infringement of copyright (the ‘practical effect 
argument’).49 However, Sackville J ultimately adopted a narrower construction, 
holding that to ‘prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work’, a 
TPM must physically prevent acts of infringement, and that merely having a 
‘general deterrent or discouraging effect’ was insufficient.50 It followed that if 
the only way in which the DRM ‘inhibited’ infringement of copyright in 
PlayStation games was by discouraging the copying of them, the DRM system 
was not a TPM within the meaning of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).51 
In the alternative, Sony argued that the access code DRM prevented users of 
an infringing copy of a game (a computer program) from reproducing a 
 
 46 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens (2002) 200 ALR 55 (‘Sony v Stevens 
(First Instance)’). 
 47 Section 116A provides that copyright holders may (subject to narrow exceptions for ‘permitted 
purposes’) bring an action for dealings with circumvention devices including the making, selling, 
hiring, distributing or exhibiting in public for trade, importation for selling hiring or exhibiting, 
making available online and promoting or advertising of a circumvention device. 
 48 Sony v Stevens (First Instance) (2002) 200 ALR 55, 79. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Ibid 81. 
 51 Ibid 82 (Sackville J). 
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substantial part of the computer program in the random access memory (‘RAM’) 
of the PlayStation console by playing it (the ‘reproduction in RAM argument’).52 
This reproduction would only infringe copyright in the game if it reproduced a 
substantial part of the game in a ‘material form’ as defined in s 10(1) of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).53 
The definition of ‘material form’, as it then stood,54 included ‘any form 
(whether visible or not) of storage from which the work or adaptation, or a 
substantial part of the work or adaptation, can be reproduced.’55 Sackville J held 
that a reproduction could only be ‘in material form’ if it was amenable to further 
reproduction, and that, because it was not possible to replicate the information 
stored in the RAM of the PlayStation console, it was not ‘in material form’. The 
reproduction in RAM argument therefore failed.56 
In a late amendment to their pleadings, Sony advanced a further alternative 
argument: that PlayStation games embodied cinematograph films, and that their 
DRM prevented their infringing reproduction in the RAM of the console (the 
‘cinematograph film argument’).57 On the ‘very sketchy’58 evidence led in 
support of this argument, his Honour was unable to conclude that the alleged 
copying constituted the making of a copy of a cinematograph film for the 
purposes of s 86(a) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).59 
Since Sony failed to make out any of their alternative arguments, it followed 
that the mod chips which Stevens was alleged to have distributed were not 
circumvention devices and Sony’s claim under s 116A of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) failed.60 
However, Sackville J noted in obiter dicta that, on the evidence before him, if 
the access code DRM had been a TPM, he would have found that the mod chips 
were circumvention devices.61 
2 Appeal 
Sony appealed to the Full Federal Court.62 The decision of the Full Federal 
Court in July 2003, while acknowledging that the construction issue was finely 
balanced, and the definition ambiguous,63 unanimously preferred a wider 
definition of ‘technological protection measure’ which included DRM systems 
 
 52 Ibid. 
 53 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 31(1)(a)(i), 36(1). 
 54 The definition was subsequently amended by the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
2004 (Cth) sch 9 pt 10 item 186. 
 55 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) (emphasis added), prior to amendment by the US Free Trade 
Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) sch 9 pt 10 item 186. 
 56 Sony v Stevens (First Instance) (2002) 200 ALR 55, 90 (Sackville J). 
 57 Ibid 63 (Sackville J). 
 58 Ibid 91. 
 59 Ibid 93. 
 60 Ibid 82 (Sackville J). Sony’s claim under s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) also failed, 
but a claim of trademark infringement against Stevens succeeded: at 69–70 (Sackville J). 
 61 Ibid 94. 
 62 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens (2003) 132 FCR 31 (‘Sony v Stevens 
(Federal Court Appeal)’). 
 63 Ibid 54 (Lindgren J). 
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that deterred or discouraged infringement.64 French J noted that issues of 
competition policy had been pressed upon the Court, but considered that it was 
the role of Parliament to address any competition issues arising from these 
laws.65 
The Full Federal Court (Finkelstein J dissenting) went on to reject Sony’s 
reproduction in RAM argument,66 and rejected the cinematograph film 
argument.67 
Stevens appealed to the High Court. In October 2005, the High Court 
unanimously agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of Sackville J and 
overturned the decision of the Full Federal Court.68 Kirby J noted, in passing, 
that Sony’s DRM systems, 
[i]n effect, and apparently intentionally … reduce global market competition. 
They inhibit rights ordinarily acquired by Australian owners of chattels to use 
and adapt the same, once acquired, to their advantage and for their use as they 
see fit.69 
Kirby J found that one of the purposes of Sony’s regional access code was 
non-copyright related, namely, to enforce ‘global market price differentiation’.70 
His Honour went on to say that 
where a choice of interpretation has to be made, the existence of the additional 
non-copyright purpose of enforcing global market price differentiation does 
constitute a reason to prefer an outcome that is consistent with the balances 
ordinarily inherent in copyright legislation over a result that is not.71 
D  The AUSFTA 
The implementation of the Digital Agenda Amendments in 2000 appears to 
have placated some US concerns, if only temporarily. In 2001, the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (‘USTR’) reported that Australia had ‘[taken] 
final action to implement the 1996 WIPO Copyright and WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaties.’72 
In 2002, the USTR noted that Australia had ‘not ratified’ the Internet 
Treaties,73 and in 2003 (after Sony’s initial defeat before the Full Federal Court) 
the USTR reported Australia has ‘not yet fully enacted the legislation necessary 
to enable Australia to accede to [the Internet Treaties]’. Further, it described the 
Digital Agenda Amendments as ‘a step toward aligning Australian copyright laws 
with the obligations imposed by [the Internet Treaties]’ but complained that it 
 
 64 Ibid 41 (French J). 
 65 Ibid. 
 66 Ibid (French J), 76–7 (Lindgren J). 
 67 Ibid 41 (French J), 79–80 (Lindgren J). 
 68 Stevens v Sony (2005) 224 CLR 193. 
 69 Ibid 243. 
 70 Ibid 255. 
 71 Ibid. 
 72 USTR, 2001 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (2001) 12. 
 73 USTR, 2002 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (2002) 10. 
     
670 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 30 
     
was ‘weak in its treatment of technological protection measures.’74 At about the 
same time, formal negotiations for the AUSFTA75 began. 
The United States is the world’s largest producer and exporter of copyrighted 
materials and ‘copyright industries’ account for over five per cent of US GDP.76 
It is perhaps then not surprising that since at least the 1980s, the US has sought 
to impose US standards of IP protection upon all other countries by tying IP 
protection to issues of international trade.77 The US pursuit of ever-increasing 
minimum standards of IP protection in multilateral and bilateral forums has been 
referred to as the ‘global ratchet for intellectual property rights.’78 
This ‘global ratchet’ manifested itself as Chapter 17 of the AUSFTA, the largest 
chapter in both content and substance.79 It requires significant amendments to 
Australian IP laws, perhaps most importantly by requiring Australia to abandon 
its independent implementation of the Internet Treaties, and instead adopt TPM 
protections modelled closely on the controversial US DMCA.80 
Under the AUSFTA, the definition of ‘technological protection measure’ is 
expanded to ‘any technology, device, or component that, in the normal course of 
its operation, controls access to a protected work, performance, phonograph, or 
other protected subject matter, or protects any copyright.’81 
Effectively, this amendment abolishes the critical distinction between ‘access 
controls’ and ‘copying controls’ (on which the decision in Stevens v Sony 
turned). The AUSFTA also requires Australia to widen significantly the 
definition of ‘circumvention device’82 and prohibits the use of a circumvention 
device,83 as opposed to prohibiting only commercial dealings with them. 
1 The Phillips Fox Review 
During the passage of the Digital Agenda Amendments, the Australian 
Government committed to review the operation of the amendments within three 
 
 74 USTR, 2003 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (2003) 10, 12. 
 75 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 (entered into force 1 January 2005) 
(‘AUSFTA’). For a more in-depth examination of the copyright changes required by the 
AUSFTA, see Matthew Rimmer, ‘Robbery under Arms: Copyright Law and the Australia–United 
States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 11(3) First Monday <http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/ 
issue11_3/rimmer/index.html>. 
 76 Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy 
Matters (‘IFAC-3’), The US–Australia Free Trade Agreement (FTA): The Intellectual Property 
Provisions — Report of the Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property 
Rights for Trade Policy Matters (IFAC-3) (2004) 8 <http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file813_3398.pdf>. 
 77 See Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, ‘Hegemony Based on Knowledge: The Role of 
Intellectual Property’ in Gordon Walker and Jianfu Chen (eds), Balancing Act: Law, Policy and 
Politics in Globalisation and Global Trade (2004) 204. 
 78 Peter Drahos, The Global Ratchet for Intellectual Property Rights: Why It Fails as Policy and 
What Should Be Done about It (2003) <http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/PDFs/IPRatchet_Drahos. 
pdf>. 
 79 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report 61: The Australia–United 
States Free Trade Agreement (2004) 225. 
 80 Other changes included a 20-year extension to the term of copyright and significant changes to 
the definition of ‘material form’. 
 81 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.7(b) (entered into force 1 January 
2005) (emphasis added). 
 82 Ibid art 17.4.7(a)(ii). 
 83 Ibid art 17.4.7(a)(i). 
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years of commencement. Law firm, Phillips Fox, was appointed to conduct this 
review which commenced in April 2003, and it delivered its report in January 
2004.84 The Phillips Fox Review was conducted after the decision in 
Sony v Stevens (Federal Court Appeal),85 but before the High Court overturned 
that decision. More importantly, the report was delivered before the AUSFTA was 
finalised. 
The Phillips Fox Review specifically considered whether the definition of 
‘technological protection measure’ achieved the objects of the Digital Agenda 
Amendments as expressed in the Explanatory Memorandum.86 In their 
submissions, copyright owners generally supported the interpretation given by 
the Full Federal Court,87 and, in one case, even argued for a wider 
interpretation.88 
The Phillips Fox Review found that it was appropriate to amend the existing 
definition of ‘technological protection measure’ to resolve the uncertainty 
created by Sony v Stevens (Federal Court Appeal).89 To better meet the 
objectives of the Digital Agenda Amendments, and to create a more appropriate 
balance between the rights of copyright holders and users of copyright 
material,90 the Phillips Fox Review also recommended that: 
• the definition of ‘technological protection measure’ be amended so as to 
accord with the interpretation favoured by Sackville J in Sony v Stevens (First 
Instance); 
• the exceptions to the prohibitions on dealing with circumvention devices91 be 
broadened to allow for the supply or use of a circumvention device for any 
use or exception allowed under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), including fair 
dealing and access to a legitimately acquired ‘non-pirated’ product; and 
• the use of circumvention devices be otherwise prohibited.92 
These recommendations are inconsistent with the AUSFTA, and in fact 
represent almost a complete reversal of its position. The Government did not 
formally respond to the Phillips Fox Review until May 2006 (a delay of over two 
years), and even then did not address the merits of the recommendations or the 
 
 84 Phillips Fox, Digital Agenda Review: Report and Recommendations (2004) 104 (‘Phillips Fox 
Review’). 
 85 (2003) 132 FCR 31. 
 86 See Phillips Fox, above n 84, chs 13–18. 
 87 Ibid 99–100. 
 88 A joint submission of the Business Software Association of Australia and the Business Software 
Alliance proposed that an even wider interpretation was necessary, arguing that the proper 
interpretation of the WCT requires the definition of ‘technological protection measure’ to extend 
to any measure to prevent any act not authorised by the copyright owner, including acts outside 
the exclusive rights of copyright owners: Submission to Phillips Fox and the Attorney-General’s 
Department, Digital Agenda Review, September 2003 (Business Software Association of 
Australia and Business Software Alliance). 
 89 Phillips Fox, above n 84, 109. 
 90 Ibid 110. 
 91 The ‘permitted purposes’ identified in Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116A(3). 
 92 Phillips Fox, above n 84, 111. 
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reasons for their rejection, stating only that they had been ‘superseded’ by the 
AUSFTA obligations.93 
2 The Reaction to the AUSFTA 
The main proponents of the copyright provisions of the AUSFTA were the 
major content providers and owners of copyright material operating in 
publishing, music, film and computer software, supported by copyright 
collecting societies and industry think tank organisations such as the Australian 
Copyright Council.94 These organisations represent the same interest groups who 
had substantial influence in the negotiation stages of the AUSFTA. One 
commentator remarked on the process of developing the AUSFTA: 
While there was a space made for US government and particular global owner 
interests to assert their preferences, there was no corresponding respect for 
unwelcome Australian perspectives from civil society interest groups like the 
Electronic Frontiers Australia, Australian Digital Alliance, Australian Library 
and Information Association, local free software and open source advocates, IP 
academics, or even passing reference to the findings of the government’s own 
IP expert committees.95 
Another noted that the IP chapter ‘gives all the appearance of a United States 
shopping list.’96 
Reaction from the public and consumers of copyright material was uniformly 
negative. Electronic Frontiers Australia Inc opposed the IP chapter in its entirety, 
noting that the ‘proposed circumvention device bans are overly strict and have 
more potential to be used as weapons against competition and innovation than 
for it.’97 Linux Australia criticised the anti-circumvention provisions as overly 
broad, with exceptions which were restrictive and unclear.98 The Australian 
Consumers’ Association felt that 
the prohibitions in the [Digital Agenda Amendments] currently go too far and 
extending such measures would intrude into consumers’ lives excessively, 
particularly given the unresolved and potentially very broad definition of 
Technological Protection Measures (TPM).99 
The Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee said the AUSFTA was ‘very 
much pitched at the interests of copyright holders at the expense of users to such 
 
 93 Australian Government, Digital Agenda Review: Government Responses to Phillips Fox 
Recommendations and Related Matters (2006) available at Attorney-General’s Department, 
Australian Government <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Publications_Reviewof 
DigitalAgendaActreforms-April2003>. 
 94 Rimmer, above n 75. 
 95 Kathy Bowrey, Law and Internet Cultures (2005) 188. 
 96 Christopher Arup, ‘The United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement: The Intellectual Property 
Chapter’ (2004) 15 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 205, 206. 
 97 Submission to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America, Parliament of Australia, 30 April 2004, Submission No 282, 16 
(Electronic Frontiers Australia Inc). 
 98 Submission to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America, Parliament of Australia, Undated, Submission No 164, 12 (Linux 
Australia). 
 99 Submission to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America, Parliament of Australia, Undated, Submission No 522 (Australian 
Consumers’ Association). 
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an extent that it alters [the balance of copyright] very much in favour of 
owners.’100 
The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (‘JSCOT’) reviewed the AUSFTA, 
and, while they recommended the adoption of the AUSFTA, JSCOT made a 
number of recommendations concerning the IP chapter to address what they 
perceived as imbalances which the AUSFTA would create. JSCOT’s 
recommendations included that: 
• the Australian fair dealing exception to copyright be replaced with an 
open-ended exception modelled on the US ‘fair use’ defence;101 
• the standard of originality required to obtain copyright protection be 
reviewed, with a view to adopting a higher standard such as that in the US;102 
and 
• the Australian Government ensure that exceptions will be available to allow 
for the use of parallel imported material and equipment.103 
The Government has not formally responded to these recommendations. 
A Senate Select Committee then reviewed the AUSFTA, and its implementing 
legislation. The negotiation of the IP chapter has been characterised as a ‘failure 
of sound and transparent policy making’ which was ‘far too detailed and will 
seriously hinder future IP policy making.’104 
The recommendations of Labor senators on the Senate Select Committee 
concurred with this assessment, stating their concern that 
Australia entered into the Intellectual Property (IP) obligations of [the 
AUSFTA] in a manner that cut across established processes for copyright law 
reform and which did not appear to be part of a strategic vision of intellectual 
property.105 
They went on to make 13 recommendations relating to IP, including 
recommendations on fair use, the requisite standard of originality and parallel 
importation, which echoed the recommendation of the JSCOT report.106 Like the 
recommendations made by the JSCOT report, the recommendations of the Labor 
senators were not taken up by the Government. Australia has until 1 January 
2007 to implement its TPM obligations under the AUSFTA.107 
 
100 Submission to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America, Parliament of Australia, 29 April 2004, Submission No 336, 5 
(Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee). 
101 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, above n 79, 240. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid 243. 
104 Submission to Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the 
United States of America, Parliament of Australia, 30 April 2004, Submission No 294, 3, 4 
(Kimberlee Weatherall). 
105 Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the United States 
of America, Parliament of Australia, Final Report (2004) 229. 
106 Ibid 230–2. 
107 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.12 (entered into force 1 January 2005). 
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E  Anti-Circumvention Litigation in the United States 
While Australia has had only one case considering its anti-circumvention laws, 
companies in the US were quick to embrace the equivalent provisions of the 
DMCA.108 Many of these cases were not brought by copyright holders to enjoin 
‘piracy’ of their digital works, but were instead arguably abuses of the law, 
brought to suppress lawful competition within markets. 
1 Chamberlain 
Chamberlain Group Inc (‘Chamberlain’) manufactured and sold garage door 
openers and wireless remote controls compatible with both their own garage 
door openers and those produced by other manufacturers (‘universal 
transmitters’).109 Skylink Technologies Inc (‘Skylink’) also manufactured and 
sold universal transmitters, and was Chamberlain’s only significant competitor in 
the market for universal transmitters.110 
Chamberlain developed a new model of garage door opener, which used a 
copyrighted ‘rolling code’ computer program to operate the garage door openers, 
purportedly as a security measure.111 Users of this newer model garage door 
opener, incorporating the rolling code protection, were unable to use transmitters 
produced by companies other than Chamberlain. Skylink then began selling a 
new model of their universal transmitter, which, although it did not incorporate 
Chamberlain’s rolling code protection, could ‘trick’ Chamberlain’s newer garage 
door openers into operating.112 
Chamberlain sued Skylink, claiming inter alia that both Chamberlain’s garage 
door openers and transmitters contained computer programs protected by 
copyright, that the rolling code system was a TPM which controlled access to 
those programs, and that Skylink’s universal transmitter was a circumvention 
device.113 Chamberlain’s motion for summary judgment on the DMCA claims 
was denied because of disputes of material fact, including whether 
Chamberlain’s rolling code software was a work protected by copyright.114 The 
United States District Court invited Skylink to file its own motion for summary 
judgment, seeking dismissal of the DMCA claims against them.115 This motion 
was later granted, with the Court holding that: 
 
108 An in-depth analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article only 
discusses so much of these cases as is required to highlight both the reasoning of the US courts 
on the proper construction and operation of the DMCA, and the facts of the cases necessary to 
analyse how they might have fared under Australian law. 
109 Chamberlain Group Inc v Skylink Technologies Inc, 381 F 3d 1178, 1183 (Gajarsa J) (Fed Cir, 
2004) (‘Chamberlain’). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid 1184–5 (Gajarsa J). 
113 Ibid 1185. 
114 Chamberlain Group Inc v Skylink Technologies Inc, 292 F Supp 2d 1023, 1038, 1040 
(Pallmeyer J) (ND Ill, 2003). 
115 Ibid 1041. 
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• the burden of proof fell on Chamberlain to establish that Skylink 
circumvented a TPM (not, as Chamberlain argued, that Skylink must prove 
that it was authorised to circumvent the TPM);116 and 
• Chamberlain never explicitly or implicitly restricted purchasers of their 
garage door openers from using universal transmitters produced by 
companies other than Chamberlain.117 
The Court also observed that purchasers of Chamberlain’s garage door openers 
have a reasonable expectation that they can replace their original Chamberlain 
transmitter with a competing universal transmitter without violating federal 
law.118 
Chamberlain appealed against the dismissal of their DMCA claims to the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals noted an underlying 
premise that 
copyright laws authorize members of the public to access a work, but not to 
copy it. The law therefore places the burden of proof on the party attempting to 
establish that the circumstances of its case deviate from these normal 
expectations; defendants must prove authorized copying and plaintiffs must 
prove unauthorized access.119 
The Court rejected the notion of an implied prohibition on access emanating 
merely from a lack of explicit authorisation.120 It noted that adopting 
Chamberlain’s construction of the DMCA would ‘grant manufacturers broad 
exemptions from both the antitrust laws and the doctrine of copyright misuse’121 
and ‘allow virtually any company to attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket 
monopolies.’122 Moreover, the Court found that the DMCA did not create a new 
de facto exclusive right of a copyright holder to regulate access to works 
protected by copyright (as Chamberlain in effect argued)123 but, rather, that it 
merely prohibited ‘forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the 
protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.’124 
The Court of Appeals concluded that on its proper construction, the 
circumvention device prohibition in § 1201(a)(2) requires: 
(1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled by a 
technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third parties can 
now access, (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5) infringes or 
facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act, because of a product 
that (6) the defendant either (i) designed or produced primarily for 
circumvention; (ii) made available despite only limited commercial significance 
 
116 Ibid 1044. 
117 Ibid 1044–5. 
118 Ibid 1046. 
119 Chamberlain, 381 F 3d 1178, 1193 (Gajarsa J) (emphasis added) (Fed Cir, 2004). 
120 Ibid. See also Zohar Efroni, ‘A Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA and 
a Dose of Common Sense’ (2005) 28 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 249, 256. 
121 Chamberlain, 381 F 3d 1178, 1193 (Gajarsa J) (Fed Cir, 2004). 
122 Ibid 1201 (Gajarsa J). 
123 Ibid 1192 (Gajarsa J). 
124 Ibid 1202 (Gajarsa J). 
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other than circumvention; or (iii) marketed for use in circumvention of the 
controlling technological measure.125 
Since Chamberlain had not shown a lack of authorisation, as required by the 
fourth element,126 or the ‘critical nexus between access and protection’ required 
by the fifth element,127 Skylink was entitled to summary judgment and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
It should also be noted that, had Chamberlain’s DMCA claims gone to trial, 
they may have been unable to establish a valid copyright on their rolling code 
software,128 which would have also defeated their claim. For the purposes of 
Skylink’s motion for summary judgment, it was assumed that a valid copyright 
existed and this issue was not further explored. Most importantly, the Court of 
Appeals in this case limited the scope of the DMCA, by requiring a link to an 
actual or potential infringement of copyright (not merely the doing of an act 
which the copyright holder seeks to prohibit). Such a link is not required on the 
face of the law. 
2 Lexmark 
Many printer manufacturers sell their printers cheaply, and make most of their 
profits by charging a substantial mark-up on consumables (such as ink and toner 
cartridges used by their printers). This represents a modern adaptation of the 
classical business model of giving away razors and charging for the blades. 
Lexmark International Inc (‘Lexmark’) was a major manufacturer of inkjet and 
laser printers, and ink and toner cartridges for those printers. New ‘genuine’ 
toner cartridges for laser printers were expensive and a secondary market had 
developed for refurbished or ‘remanufactured’ toner cartridges — that is, used 
genuine cartridges which have been cleaned, repaired and refilled with toner. 
Lexmark adopted a policy of selling new toner cartridges under two different 
models. ‘Prebate’ cartridges were sold at a discounted price, but purported to 
impose a contractual obligation on the purchaser (by means of a ‘shrink-wrap’ 
agreement on the packaging) to use the cartridge only once, and then return the 
empty cartridge to Lexmark.129 ‘Non-prebate’ cartridges were sold without the 
discount and without the limitation on reuse and return.130 Both types of toner 
cartridge contained a microchip which communicated with the printer, for 
functions such as reporting the amount of toner remaining in the cartridge.131 
The microchip also performed an authentication ‘handshake’ with the printer, 
designed to prevent the printer from operating with toner cartridges produced by 
anyone other than Lexmark.132 The authentication process would also prevent a 
 
125 Ibid 1203 (Gajarsa J) (emphasis in original). 
126 Ibid 1202 (Gajarsa J). 
127 Ibid 1204 (Gajarsa J). 
128 For reasons which will be discussed in the context of Lexmark International Inc v Static Control 
Components Inc, 387 F 3d 522 (6th Cir, 2004) (‘Lexmark’): see below nn 138–43 and 
accompanying text. 
129 Ibid 530 (Sutton J). 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid 529–30 (Sutton J). 
132 Ibid 530. 
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prebate cartridge from operating if it had been refilled by anyone other than 
Lexmark or their authorised agents.133 
Static Control Components Inc (‘SCC’) produced a range of technology 
products, including products used in the remanufacturing of inkjet and toner 
cartridges produced by Lexmark and other companies. One of these products, the 
‘SMARTEK’ chip, was a replacement for the microchip in Lexmark toner 
cartridges. It allowed prebate cartridges with the replacement SMARTEK chip to 
be refilled by companies other than Lexmark or their authorised agents and still 
be used with Lexmark printers.134 These remanufactured cartridges were then 
sold to consumers as a low cost alternative to the new Lexmark cartridges.135 
The SMARTEK chip contained a verbatim copy of a tiny piece of software in the 
Lexmark chip, known as the Toner Loading Program (‘TLP’).136 
Lexmark sued SCC, claiming that: 
1 SCC’s reproduction of the TLP on their SMARTEK chip was a violation of 
copyright; 
2 SCC violated the DMCA by selling a product that circumvents access 
controls on the TLP; and 
3 SCC violated the DMCA by selling a product that circumvents access 
controls on the software located within the printer (the ‘Printer Engine 
Program’). 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court decided that Lexmark had 
shown a likelihood of success on each claim and entered a preliminary injunction 
against SCC.137 SCC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
First, the Court of Appeals considered whether the TLP was copyrightable. 
Under US law, copyright protection only extends to the original expression of an 
idea, as opposed to the underlying idea itself, or to the functional or factual 
aspects of the work.138 Copyright protection does not extend to ‘any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, 
regardless of [its] form.’139  
In the Court’s opinion, ‘[g]enerally speaking, “lock-out” codes fall on the 
functional-idea rather than the original-expression side of the copyright line’ and 
that ‘[t]o the extent compatibility requires that a particular code sequence be 
included in the component device to permit its use, the merger and scenes a faire 
doctrines generally preclude the code sequence from obtaining copyright 
 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid 530–1. 
135 Ibid 530. 
136 Ibid. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the TLP is so small that the phrase ‘Lexmark 
International, Inc vs Static Control Components, Inc’ in ASCII format would occupy more 
memory than the TLP itself: at 529–30. 
137 Lexmark International Inc v Static Control Components Inc, 253 F Supp 2d 943 (D Ky, 2003). 
138 Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc, 977 F 2d 1510, 1524 (Reinhardt J) (9th Cir, 1992). 
139 DMCA, 17 USC § 102(b) (1998). 
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protection’,140 citing authorities involving interoperability issues in the context of 
computer games.141 
The Court held that, as functionality and efficiency constraints precluded any 
material changes to the TLP,142 and because it was almost impossible to change 
the TLP without breaking the authentication handshake,143 the TLP functioned as 
a lock-out code and was not copyrightable. Therefore, Lexmark’s copyright 
infringement claim was dismissed. 
This finding rendered moot a fair use defence which was raised by SCC and 
rejected by the District Court. However the Court of Appeals chose to comment 
on the lower court’s reasoning in rejecting that defence.144 The fair use defence 
comprises a four-factor test: 
1 the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
2 the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3 the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4 the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.145 
The District Court had held that the first, third and fourth factors weighed 
heavily in favour of Lexmark, and that the second favoured SCC only slightly.146 
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower court’s reasoning on the first and 
fourth elements. While acknowledging that a profit-making purpose generally 
militates against a finding of fair use,147 it is not the case that any profit-making 
purpose weighs against fair use, as the crux of this factor ‘is not whether the sole 
motive of the use is monetary gain’ — the question is whether ‘the user stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.’148 The Court of Appeals held that, on the evidence before it, it 
was far from clear that SCC had copied the TLP to exploit the TLP itself, 
preferring the view that SCC had copied the TLP merely to permit refilled 
prebate cartridges to function with Lexmark’s printers.149 
On the fourth factor, the Court of Appeals held that the lower court had erred 
in considering the effect of SCC’s copying on the market for toner cartridges and 
should have instead considered the effect on the market for the copyrighted work 
— that is, the market for TLPs.150 Any harm to Lexmark’s market for toner 
 
140 Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 536 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004). 
141 Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc, 977 F 2d 1510, 1524 (Reinhardt J) (9th Cir, 1992); Atari 
Games Corp v Nintendo of America Inc, 18 USPQ (2d) (BNA) 1935 (ND Cal, 1991). 
142 Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 539 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004). 
143 Ibid 541–2 (Sutton J). 
144 Ibid 544 (Sutton J). 
145 DMCA, 17 USC § 107 (1998). 
146 Lexmark International Inc v Static Control Components Inc, 253 F Supp 2d 943, 960–2 
(Forester CJ) (D Ky, 2003). 
147 Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 544 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004). 
148 Harper & Row, Publishers Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 562 (O’Connor J) (1985), 
cited in Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 544 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004) (emphasis added). 
149 Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 544 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004). 
150 Ibid 544–5. 
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cartridges or prebate programme was not relevant as ‘that is not the sort of 
market or value that copyright law protects.’151 
Lexmark’s DMCA claims fared no better than their copyright claim. The 
Printer Engine Program software resides in the unprotected, unencrypted 
memory of the laser printer, and can be freely copied from that memory.152 The 
DMCA requires that a technical measure must effectively control access153 and 
does ‘not extend to a technological measure that restricts one form of access but 
leaves another route wide open.’154 Their DMCA claim relating to protection of 
the Printer Engine Program failed for this reason. 
The DMCA claim concerning protection of the TLP failed because the 
SMARTEK chip did not provide ‘access’ to the TLP; rather it was a replacement 
for the TLP.155 
As Lexmark failed to establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims, the 
Court of Appeals vacated the preliminary injunction against SCC and remanded 
the case to the District Court for further proceedings.156 
In effect, the object of Lexmark’s DMCA claims was not to prevent 
infringement of their copyrighted work — it was to prevent competitors from 
supplying cheaper cartridges for use with Lexmark’s printers. 
3 StorageTek 
Tape silos are large and expensive devices used by computer systems and 
servers to store massive amounts of computer data. They are typically used in 
large corporate environments such as banks and telecommunications carriers to 
support the operation of mission-critical computer systems such as mainframe 
computers. The reliability and constant availability of these silo systems are 
critical for the businesses that employ them. Tape silo failures are extremely 
destructive and costly, and there is a significant market for the service and 
maintenance of the silos. 
StorageTek produced and sold tape silos, and also provided maintenance 
services and parts for their silos. StorageTek silos operated using computer 
software contained within them, which was divided into software that operated 
the silo system (‘Functional Code’) and software for the maintenance of the 
system (‘Maintenance Code’).157 The Maintenance Code, if activated, produced 
error messages (‘fault symptom codes’) concerning the operation of the silos 
which were necessary to diagnose faults with the silos and properly service them. 
When StorageTek sold a silo, it contained both the Functional Code and the 
Maintenance Code, but the customer was only licensed to use the Functional 
Code. Although both types of code were loaded into memory when a silo booted, 
the Maintenance Code was normally disabled and could only be enabled or 
 
151 Ibid 545. 
152 Ibid 546–7 (Sutton J). 
153 DMCA, 17 USC § 1201(a)(2) (1998) (emphasis added). 
154 Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 547 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004). 
155 Ibid 563 (Sutton J). 
156 Ibid 551 (Sutton J). 
157 Storage Technology Corporation d/b/a StorageTek v Custom Hardware Engineering & 
Consulting Inc, No 02-12102-RWZ, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 12391 (D Mass, 2004) (‘StorageTek’). 
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activated by use of a special password used with a proprietary algorithm called 
‘GetKey’. 
Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting Inc (‘CHE’) was an independent 
business that repaired tape silos produced by StorageTek. In order to diagnose 
problems with the silos, CHE would circumvent the GetKey password system to 
enable the Maintenance Code and intercept and interpret the fault symptom 
codes produced by it. As part of this process, CHE would reboot the tape silos, 
causing both the Functional Code and Maintenance Code to be copied into the 
memory of the silo. 
StorageTek sued CHE, alleging inter alia that by rebooting the silos and 
causing the Maintenance Code to be copied into the memory as a normal part of 
the booting process, CHE had infringed StorageTek’s copyright in the 
Maintenance Code. StorageTek further alleged that CHE’s circumvention of the 
GetKey password system to activate the Maintenance Code violated the DMCA. 
CHE counterclaimed, alleging inter alia that StorageTek had engaged in illegal 
monopolisation and tying under §§ 1–2 of the Sherman Act.158 
StorageTek sought a preliminary injunction to restrain CHE from 
circumventing GetKey and using the Maintenance Code to diagnose faults with 
the tape silos. CHE relied on several defences to StorageTek’s claims, including 
a specific exception in the US DMCA to facilitate the repair and maintenance of 
computer systems.159 
This exception, set out in 17 USC § 117(c) (1998), provides that: 
it is not an infringement for the owner or lessee of a machine to make or 
authorize the making of a copy of a computer program if such copy is made 
solely by virtue of the activation of a machine that lawfully contains an 
authorized copy of the computer program, for purposes only of maintenance or 
repair of that machine, if — 
(1) such new copy is used in no other manner and is destroyed 
immediately after the maintenance or repair is completed; and 
(2) with respect to any computer program or part thereof that is not 
necessary for that machine to be activated, such program or part 
thereof is not accessed or used other than to make such new copy by 
virtue of the activation of the machine. 
CHE argued many other defences, including that they enjoyed the benefits of 
their customers’ licences to copy the code into memory in order to activate the 
tape silos, and that their copying was fair use. 
The District Court characterised CHE’s conduct as free-riding on StorageTek’s 
investment in producing the Maintenance Code160 and, finding that StorageTek 
had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success, granted a preliminary 
injunction.161 CHE appealed from that decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals. 
 
158 15 USC §§ 1–2 (2000 & Supp IV, 2004). 
159 DMCA, 17 USC § 117(c) (1998). The closest equivalent under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) is 
s 47B. 
160 StorageTek, No 02-12102-RWZ, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 12391, [*18] (Zobel J) (D Mass, 2004). 
161 Ibid. 
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The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had misconstrued the 
§ 117(c) exception162 by focusing on the purpose of ‘repair’ while ignoring the 
wider definition of ‘maintenance’ within the statute.163 The Court noted that the 
extrinsic materials supported a reading of ‘maintenance’ which encompassed the 
ongoing monitoring of systems for problems, and the policy underlying § 117(c) 
was ‘to ensure that independent service organizations do not inadvertently 
become liable for copyright infringement merely because they have turned on a 
machine in order to service its hardware components.’164 
The Court concluded that CHE was likely to succeed on the § 117(c) defence. 
The Court also held that CHE was likely to succeed on their argument that, as an 
agent of the silo owner, it was protected by the silo owner’s licence to copy the 
software to boot the silo.165 
Turning to the DMCA claims, the Court held that under the reasoning in 
Chamberlain, to the extent CHE’s activities did not constitute copyright 
infringement, StorageTek could not maintain an action under the DMCA.166 As in 
Chamberlain, there was not a sufficient nexus between the circumvention 
complained of and the rights protected by copyright law.167 
After disposing of a related trade secret issue, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the District Court had erred in law when considering StorageTek’s copyright 
and DMCA claims, and that it had overlooked material factors in its analysis of 
the DMCA and trade secret claims.168 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held 
that the District Court had abused its discretion in granting the preliminary 
injunction, which was vacated, and remanded the case for further proceedings.169 
The District Court later granted summary judgment to CHE on the copyright 
and DMCA claims against them.170 
4 The bnetd Case 
Davidson & Associates Inc, trading as Blizzard Entertainment (‘Blizzard’), 
created and sold computer games. Many of these games could be played against 
other players over the internet, using a service supplied by Blizzard known as 
‘Battle.net’. When a user connected to the Battle.net service, Battle.net would 
carry out a ‘secret handshake’ with the user’s game, performing certain checks in 
 
162 Storage Technology Corporation (doing business as StorageTek) v Custom Hardware 
Engineering & Consulting Inc, 421 F 3d 1307, 1312 (Bryson J) (Fed Cir, 2005). 
163 DMCA, 17 USC § 117(d) (1998) reads: ‘the restoring of the machine to the state of working in 
accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for 
that machine’, with ‘maintenance’ defined as ‘the servicing of the machine in order to make it 
work in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications 
authorized for that machine’. 
164 Committee Report on WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation and On-Line Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation, H R Rep No 105-551(1), 27 (1998), cited in Storage 
Technology Corporation (doing business as StorageTek) v Custom Hardware Engineering & 
Consulting Inc, 421 F 3d 1307, 1311–12 (Bryson J) (Fed Cir, 2005). 
165 Storage Technology Corporation (doing business as StorageTek) v Custom Hardware 
Engineering & Consulting, 421 F 3d 1307, 1317 (Bryson J) (Fed Cir, 2005). 
166 Ibid 1318 (Bryson J). 
167 Ibid 1319 (Bryson J). 
168 Ibid 1321 (Bryson J). 
169 Ibid. 
170 Storage Technology Corporation v Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting Ltd, 
No 02-12102-RWZ, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 43690 (D Mass, 2006). 
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an attempt to prevent the use of infringing copies of the Blizzard games with the 
Battle.net service. 
For various reasons, many users of the Battle.net service became dissatisfied 
with the quality and reliability of Battle.net, and sought to develop an alternative 
service. Tim Jung and others collaborated to develop an open-source software 
project named ‘bnetd’ which interoperated with the Blizzard games and offered 
online gaming functionality similar to the Battle.net service. By necessity, the 
developers of bnetd used reverse engineering techniques to obtain information 
necessary to produce the bnetd software. However, as the bnetd developers did 
not have access to the information necessary to emulate the secret handshake and 
perform the anti-infringement tests, the bnetd software omitted these tests, 
consequentially allowing the use of potentially infringing copies of games with 
the bnetd software. 
Blizzard sued Jung and other parties involved with the bnetd project, claiming 
inter alia that they had infringed Blizzard trademarks and copyrights, breached 
the End User Licence Agreements (‘EULA’) under which the games were 
published, breached the Battle.net terms of use (‘TOU’), and that bnetd was a 
circumvention device. 
Early in the case, the District Court entered a consent decree which resolved 
many of the claims made against the defendants. In the consent decree, the 
defendants agreed that they had incorporated copyrighted materials created by 
Blizzard into the bnetd software without authorisation. The parties agreed that 
the remaining claims, including breach of the EULA and TOU, and the DMCA 
claims, would be resolved by the Court on the parties’ existing motions for 
summary judgment.171 
The TOU provided inter alia that users of the games must not ‘reverse engineer 
… disassemble or de-compile in whole or in part any Battle.net software’, ‘host 
or provide [online gaming services] for any Blizzard software programs or 
emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Blizzard as part of 
Battle.net’ or ‘use Blizzard’s intellectual property rights contained in Battle.net to 
create or provide any other means through which Blizzard entertainment 
software products … may be played by others, including, not limited to, server 
emulators.’172 The EULA also contained a prohibition on reverse engineering.173 
Although it is well-established that reverse engineering of computer software 
can be protected as fair use,174 US courts have held that reverse engineering can 
be prohibited by contract.175 Since the defendants had previously agreed to the 
‘click-wrap’ EULA and TOU agreements which prohibited reverse engineering, 
 
171 Davidson & Associates Inc v Internet Gateway, 334 F Supp 2d 1164, 1167 (Shaw J) (D Mo, 
2004). 
172 Ibid 1171 (Shaw J). 
173 Ibid. 
174 Bowers (doing business as HLB Technology) v Baystate Technologies Inc, 320 F 3d 1317, 1325 
(Rader J) (Fed Cir, 2003) (‘Bowers v Baystate Technologies’); Sony Computer Entertainment 
Inc v Connectix Corporation, 203 F 3d 596, 602 (Canby J) (9th Cir, 2000); Sega Enterprises 
Ltd v Accolade Inc, 977 F 2d 1510 (9th Cir, 1993). 
175 ‘[P]rivate parties are free to contractually forego the limited ability to reverse engineer a 
software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act.’: Bowers v Baystate Technologies, 
320 F 3d 1317, 1325–6 (Rader J) (Fed Cir, 2003). 
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the District Court held they had waived their fair use right to reverse-engineer 
the software.176 The Court also held that because bnetd circumvented the 
Battle.net secret handshake, it was a circumvention device within the meaning of 
the DMCA and that the reverse engineering exception in the DMCA did not 
apply.177 
The defendants appealed from this decision to the US Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the District Court.178 
F  Comparative Copyright Law Analysis 
US copyright law differs from that of Australia in a number of important 
respects. In our opinion, divergence will continue even after the AUSFTA is fully 
implemented. Many of these differences will be problematic for producers of 
interoperable products. In this section, we consider the IP law issues raised in the 
US cases considered in the preceding section and how those issues would be 
dealt with under Australian copyright law. 
1 The Standard of Originality and the Protection of Functional Elements 
As the decision of the Court of Appeals in Lexmark demonstrates, US 
copyright law protects only works with a ‘creative spark’ or ‘minimal degree of 
creativity’179 and will not protect the functional aspects of computer software. 
Well-established doctrines of merger180 and scenes à faire181 are ‘staples of 
copyright law’ used to ascertain the ‘elusive boundary line’ between idea and 
expression.182 
The threshold for obtaining copyright protection in Australia is significantly 
lower: it merely requires ‘labour and expense’ or ‘industrious collection’.183 As 
an example, compilations of factual information such as telephone directories are 
protected by copyright in Australia,184 but not in the United States.185 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) defines ‘computer program’ as ‘a set of 
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order 
 
176 Davidson & Associates Inc v Internet Gateway, 334 F Supp 2d 1164, 1181 (Shaw J) (D Mo, 
2004). 
177 Ibid 1184–5 (Shaw J). 
178 Davidson & Associates, doing business as Blizzard Entertainment Inc v Jung, 422 F 3d 630 (8th 
Cir, 2005) (‘bnetd Case’). 
179 Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co Inc, 499 US 340, 345 (O’Connor J) (1991). 
180 Where the ‘expression is essential to the statement of the idea’, or where there is only one way or 
very few easy ways of expressing the idea, the idea and expression are said to have ‘merged’: 
Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 535 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004) (citations omitted). In these instances, 
copyright protection does not exist because granting protection to the expressive component of 
the work would necessarily extend protection to the work’s uncopyrightable ideas as well: at 
535. 
181 Where external factors constrain the choice of expressive vehicle, the doctrine of scenes à faire 
precludes copyright protection. In the computer software context, the doctrine means that the 
elements of a program dictated by practical realities — for example, by hardware standards and 
mechanical specifications, software standards and compatibility requirements, computer 
manufacturer design standards, target industry practices and standard computer programming 
practices — may not obtain protection: ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 491. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co Inc, 499 US 340 (1991). 
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to bring about a certain result’186 and computer programs are protected as literary 
works.187 
As applied to computer software, the High Court of Australia held that the 
verbatim copying of 127 bits188 of computer data — an amount less than half the 
size of the Lexmark TLP — infringed the copyright which subsisted in the 
program from which it was copied.189 Under Australian law, it is highly likely 
that the TLP at issue in Lexmark would be protected by copyright. By 
reproducing the TLP, SCC would have infringed Lexmark’s copyright in the 
program, unless a defence was available to them. 
The Digital Agenda Amendments, the DMCA, and the AUSFTA all require that 
a TPM must protect a work in which copyright subsists. Subtle differences in the 
scope of copyright protection for computer code (especially functional codes 
used to facilitate technological lock-outs) will be critical in determining the 
legality of steps taken to create interoperable products. 
2 The Scope of Fair Use/Dealing Exceptions 
The copyright exception for ‘fair use’ copying which exists in the United 
States has no exact equivalent under Australian law. Fair use is an ‘open-ended’ 
defence, and as seen in the decision of the Court of Appeals in Lexmark, 
although a commercial or profit-making purpose weighs against the application 
of a fair use defence, it does not preclude it completely.190 
Australian copyright law instead recognises a purpose-based ‘fair dealing’ 
exception, permitting limited copying only for the purposes of: 
1 research or study;191 
2 criticism or review;192 
3 news reporting;193 and 
4 judicial proceedings or obtaining legal advice.194 
Any copying other than for these purposes (for example, for commercial 
purposes, or for reverse engineering to produce interoperable products) cannot 
fall within the fair dealing exception, and a defendant would have to rely on a 
more specific exception such as that in s 47D of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
 
186 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
187 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 10(1), 31(1). 
188 A ‘bit’ is the smallest unit of computer data, representing a binary one or zero. Eight bits make 
one ‘byte’, which at its most basic level can represent one letter of the alphabet. This footnote is 
approximately 320 bytes long, or 20 times larger than the copied code in Autodesk Inc v Dyason 
[No 1] (1992) 173 CLR 330. 
189 Autodesk Inc v Dyason [No 1] (1992) 173 CLR 330. This case is also interesting in that the 
infringing copying was in the context of producing a device that would almost certainly be 
alleged to be a circumvention device under modern anti-circumvention laws. 
190 See above nn 144–9 and accompanying text. 
191 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40, 103A. 
192 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 41, 103B. 
193 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 42, 103C. 
194 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 43, 104. 
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3 The Interoperability Exception — Section 47D 
In the United States, reverse engineering to produce interoperable products has 
been held to be fair use,195 but is not otherwise specifically protected at law. In 
Australia, s 47D of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) provides: 
(1) Subject to this Division, the copyright in a literary work that is a 
computer program is not infringed by the making of a reproduction or 
adaptation of the work if: 
(a) the reproduction or adaptation is made by, or on behalf of, the 
owner or licensee of the copy of the program (the original 
program) used for making the reproduction or adaptation; and 
(b) the reproduction or adaptation is made for the purpose of 
obtaining information necessary to enable the owner or licensee, 
or a person acting on behalf of the owner or licensee, to make 
independently another program (the new program), or an 
article, to connect to and be used together with, or otherwise to 
interoperate with, the original program or any other program; 
and 
(c) the reproduction or adaptation is made only to the extent 
reasonably necessary to obtain the information referred to in 
paragraph (b); and 
(d) to the extent that the new program reproduces or adapts the 
original program, it does so only to the extent necessary to 
enable the new program to connect to and be used together with, 
or otherwise to interoperate with, the original program or the 
other program; and 
(e) the information referred to in paragraph (b) is not readily 
available to the owner or licensee from another source when the 
reproduction or adaptation is made.196 
This exception was inserted by the Copyright Amendment (Computer 
Programs) Act 1999 (Cth) and has yet to be judicially considered. However, it is 
doubtful whether the conduct of SCC in Lexmark would benefit from this 
section. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that SCC’s verbatim reproduction of the 
TLP in their SMARTEK chips was ‘to make independently another … article 
[the SMARTEK chips], to connect to and be used together with, or otherwise to 
interoperate with … any other program [the software in the Lexmark 
printers].’197 The requirement that the reproduction be made ‘for the purpose of 
obtaining information’198 may be more problematic. It could perhaps be argued 
that in Lexmark, the ‘information necessary’ was the TLP itself. 
We consider that s 47D, read as a whole, deals with copying and adaptation by 
way of reverse engineering and would not extend to a verbatim reproduction of 
the original, even where it was the only way to achieve interoperability. Although 
 
195 See Bowers v Baystate Technologies, 320 F 3d 1317, 1325 (Rader J) (Fed Cir, 2003); Sony 
Computer Entertainment Inc v Connectix Corporation, 203 F 3d 596, 602 (Canby J) (9th Cir, 
2000); Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc, 977 F 2d 1510 (9th Cir, 1993). 
196 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47D (emphasis added). 
197 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47D(1)(b). 
198 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47D(1)(b). 
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the title of the provision, ‘Reproducing Computer Programs To Make 
Interoperable Products’, may support a wider construction, the extrinsic 
materials do not. 
The Explanatory Memorandum for the Copyright Amendment (Computer 
Programs) Bill 1999 (Cth) states that: 
New s 47D exempts from infringement the reproduction of a program in the 
course of finding out how it interfaces with other programs, if done for the 
purpose of independently creating an [sic] interoperable software or other 
product and if the information is not already available.199 
The Second Reading Speech talks of the need for an exception to ensure that 
‘decompilation’ (a technical process often used in reverse engineering computer 
software) to create interoperable products is permitted, and the Minister 
responsible stated that: 
the change to allow decompilation in the circumstances I have described will 
ensure that only interface information may be discovered and that this 
information may be used only for the purpose of making an interoperable 
product. This limited sanctioning of decompilation will not weaken the existing 
proscription of software piracy.200 
The s 47D exception would seem to be confined to copying necessary for 
reverse engineering and would not extend to verbatim copying of original 
software, even where this is the only way to achieve interoperability. By the use 
of check sums, digital signatures or other authentication mechanisms, companies 
could exploit this shortcoming of the exception. By following Lexmark’s 
approach and essentially making their software ‘reverse engineering-proof’, 
companies might be able to preclude competitors from developing interoperable 
products. 
Section 47H provides that certain exceptions (including the reverse 
engineering exception in s 47D) cannot be excluded or limited by agreement.201 
This protection is essential, as almost every licence agreement or EULA for 
commercial technology products purports to prohibit reverse engineering, which 
would render the s 47D exception essentially ineffective — as was clearly 
demonstrated in the bnetd Case.202 
This is one of the few areas where Australian copyright law is more conducive 
to the production of interoperable technology products than US law. 
4 Contractual Restrictions on the Use of Interoperable Products 
Some licence agreements purport to restrict the use of competing products or 
services. For example, the Apple iTunes Music Store terms of service provide 
that the user ‘will not access the Service by any means other than through 
 
199 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Bill 1999 (Cth) 2. 
200 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 August 1999, 8480 
(Daryl Williams, Attorney-General). 
201 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47H provides: ‘An agreement, or a provision of an agreement, that 
excludes or limits, or has the effect of excluding or limiting, the operation of … section … 47D 
… has no effect.’ 
202 422 F 3d 630 (8th Cir, 2005). See Davidson & Associates Inc v Internet Gateway, 334 F Supp 2d 
1164 (Shaw J) (D Mo, 2004). 
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software that is provided by iTunes for accessing the Service’ and requires the 
use of ‘authorised’ digital player devices.203 
If these terms ‘exclude or limit, or have the effect of excluding or limiting’ the 
operation of s 47D, they would have no effect, under s 47H, against a person 
undertaking reverse engineering to produce an interoperable product. However, 
these terms would be binding on users of the original product, who wished to use 
the competing interoperable product. Although s 47H protects the producers of 
interoperable products, it fails to protect the users of such products. The 
inclusion of such contractual conditions may constitute exclusive dealing under 
s 47(2) of the TPA, and will be examined later in this article.204 
5 Circumventing TPMs To Produce Interoperable Products 
As the law currently stands,205 while commercial dealings with circumvention 
devices are prohibited,206 the use of circumvention devices and the actual 
circumvention of TPMs are not prohibited. The implementation of the remaining 
anti-circumvention provisions of the AUSFTA will change this situation by 1 
January 2007,207 but an exception may be available for 
non-infringing reverse engineering activities with regard to a lawfully obtained 
copy of a computer program, carried out in good faith with respect to particular 
elements of that computer program that have not been readily available to the 
person engaged in those activities, for the sole purpose of achieving 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs.208 
The legislation implementing these provisions of the AUSFTA has not yet been 
released. 
6 Interoperable Products May Be Prohibited as ‘Circumvention Devices’ 
Under the Digital Agenda Amendments, a ‘circumvention device’ is defined as: 
a device (including a computer program) having only a limited commercially 
significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the 
circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an [sic] technological 
protection measure.209 
Whether any given interoperable product falls within this definition is a 
question of fact and will depend on the nature and purpose of the product itself. 
It is likely that products whose main purpose is bypassing a TPM to facilitate 
interoperability (such as copying TPM-protected Apple iTunes music to a 
non-Apple portable player) will be found to be a circumvention device. 
 
203 Apple Computer Australia, iTunes Store Terms of Service (2006) cls 8(b), 9(a) <http://www. 
apple.com/legal/itunes/au/service.html/>. 
204 See below Part III(C). 
205 This article was written in mid-2006, before the introduction of the legislation implementing the 
remaining TPM provisions of the AUSFTA. 
206 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116A(1). 
207 AUSFTA, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.7(a)(i) (entered into force 1 
January 2005). 
208 Ibid art 17.4.7(e)(i). 
209 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). See further above n 42. 
     
688 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 30 
     
Additionally, because the definition tests for a ‘commercially significant 
purpose or use,’ there is a risk to products, such as open-source computer 
software, which are distributed for free or on non-commercial terms. It may be 
that any open-source software which circumvents a TPM will be prohibited as a 
circumvention device for this reason. 
While the AUSFTA does not use the term ‘circumvention device’, its 
equivalent provisions deal with devices (including software) or services that: 
(A)  are promoted, advertised, or marketed for the purpose of circumvention of 
any effective technological measure; 
(B)  have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent any effective technological measure; or 
(C)  are primarily designed, produced, or performed for the purpose of 
enabling or facilitating the circumvention of any effective technological 
measure.210 
The scope of these provisions is considerably wider than the definition of 
‘circumvention device’ under the current Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). An 
interoperable product would not currently be a circumvention device if it has a 
commercially significant purpose or use other than circumvention of a TPM. 
Under the AUSFTA, the same product might be a circumvention device merely 
because it was ‘promoted, advertised, or marketed’ for the purpose of 
circumvention, or designed or produced to facilitate circumvention. 
A literal reading of the AUSFTA would require that any device advertised for 
the purpose of circumvention be prohibited as a circumvention device, even 
where the device is not, in fact, capable of circumventing a TPM. 
7 Circumvention Devices May Only Be Made for Limited Purposes 
Under the Digital Agenda Amendments, circumvention devices may only be 
made or imported: 
(a)  for use only for a permitted purpose relating to a work or other subject-
matter that is not readily available in a form that is not protected by a 
technological protection measure; or 
(b)  for the purpose of enabling a person to supply the device, or to supply a 
circumvention service, for use only for a permitted purpose.211 
A circumvention device is taken to be used for a permitted purpose only if: 
(a)  the device … is used for the purpose of doing an act comprised in the 
copyright in a work or other subject-matter; and 
(b)  the doing of the act is not an infringement of the copyright in the work or 
other subject matter under section 47(D) …212 
It seems then that a circumvention device may be lawfully made or imported to 
facilitate any reverse engineering necessary to produce interoperable products 
 
210 Opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.7(b) (entered into force 1 January 
2005). 
211 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116A(4). 
212 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116A(7). The other sections included in sub-s (b) are exceptions for 
error-correction and security testing of computer software, libraries and archives, educational 
institutions and for the services of the Crown. 
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under s 47D, but cannot otherwise be lawfully made or imported to achieve 
interoperability by circumventing a TPM. 
8 Circumvention Devices May Only Be Supplied to Limited Persons 
Circumvention devices may only be supplied to a person who is a ‘qualified 
person’, and if that person gives the supplier a lengthy declaration containing 
their name, address and justification for obtaining the device.213 
‘Qualified person’, in the context of the production of interoperable products, 
means a person referred to in s 47D(1)(a) — that is, the owner or licensee, or 
their agent, of a copy of the original computer software, who performs the 
reverse engineering permitted by that section.214 
Like the exceptions for making and importing circumvention devices, the 
exceptions for supplying circumvention devices facilitate the making of 
interoperable products. However, if the interoperable products themselves 
constitute a circumvention device, they do not allow the supply of those 
products. 
9 Excludability of Circumvention Device Exceptions 
Unlike the reverse engineering exception in s 47D of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth), the exceptions in s 116A, allowing the making, importation and supply of 
circumvention devices, are not protected by a provision analogous to s 47F. The 
effect of this is that a contractual prohibition on the making, importation or 
supply of circumvention devices will be effective, at least to the extent that it 
does not have the ‘effect of excluding or limiting’ an exception relating to 
computer software protected by s 47H.215 
10 Summary 
Australian copyright law currently provides some exceptions to facilitate the 
production of interoperable products. However, these exceptions are very narrow 
and have not yet been judicially considered. At least some conduct identified in 
overseas precedents (for example, Lexmark) would seem to fall outside these 
exceptions. 
The exceptions allow circumvention devices to be used to create interoperable 
products but, as a practical matter, do not allow interoperable products to be 
circumvention devices. Under the current law, care must be taken to give 
interoperable products a commercially significant purpose or use other than 
circumventing a TPM. Once implemented, the AUSFTA will impose an even 
greater constraint, including constraints on the marketing, advertising and design 
of interoperable products. 
Anti-circumvention laws protect copyrighted material from infringement — 
anti-circumvention laws by design, copyright law as a result of a degree of 
judicial restraint in interpreting the relevant legislation. The scope of copyright 
 
213 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116A(3). 
214 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47D(1)(a). 
215 The protected exceptions are Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 47B(3) (copies incidentally made for 
studying software), 47C (making backup copies), 47D (reverse engineering), 47E 
(error-correction), 47F (security testing). 
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protection, and the available defences and exceptions to infringement, will 
therefore define the overall scope of anti-circumvention protection. 
The US has a high standard of originality, limited protection for functional 
computer software and a broad fair use defence. There is a very real danger that 
an anti-circumvention law which acts as an infringement control in the US will 
act as an access control if introduced into a jurisdiction with a low standard of 
originality and limited defences, such as Australia. The devil is well and truly in 
the detail, and much will depend on the exact wording of the legislation which 
will implement the AUSFTA-mandated changes. 
I I I   COMPETITION LAW AND AN T I-CIRCUMVENTION LAW  
In this Part, we examine the competition law issues raised by the US cases 
canvassed in Part II(E) and consider how they would be dealt with under 
Australian competition law. Lexmark and Chamberlain demonstrate that DRM 
technology is being used (or misused) by companies — not to protect their IP 
rights, but in an attempt to hinder or preclude competition in aftermarkets. 
Owners of DRM technology can unilaterally refuse to license the technology to 
companies seeking to develop competing products. Such conduct could be 
challenged under Part IV of the TPA. 
Not all practices facilitated by DRM are anti-competitive. DRM is used to 
enforce region-coding systems for the distribution of DVDs and PlayStation 
games. Region-coding facilitates geographic price discrimination, but price 
discrimination is common in industries with high fixed costs and low marginal 
costs, such as the production of motion pictures and computer software. Such 
discrimination can be economically efficient, and while it may be unpopular with 
consumers who are forced to pay higher prices, it is not prohibited as such under 
the TPA. 
However, DRM can undermine competition. Part II(F)(3)–(10) discussed in 
depth how anti-circumvention laws can inhibit the development and sale of 
interoperable products where such products must circumvent a TPM in order to 
function. 
The use of region-coding is another example of DRM undermining 
competition in the free market.216 Copyright holders have zealously guarded 
their exclusive right to control importation of copyright material.217 The 
Australian Government in the late 1990s decided on policy grounds to remove 
those rights for most categories of material.218 The use of DRM and 
region-coding by copyright holders amounts to a de facto reintroduction of these 
rights, allowing copyright holders to eliminate arbitrage and charge monopoly 
prices in each discrete country. The copyright holders have used DRM 
technology to circumvent the Government’s policy to allow parallel importation 
of many types of material. The Government has responded to this by announcing 
 
216 Note that just because a practice ‘undermines competition’ does not necessarily mean it will be 
‘anti-competitive’ as such, or be prohibited by the TPA. 
217 See, eg, the placing of Australia on the USTR ‘watch list’ of countries with inadequate or 
ineffective IP protection: see above n 34 and accompanying text. See also IFAC-3, above n 76, 
10. 
218 See above n 30 and accompanying text. 
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that they will remove anti-circumvention protection from DRM that enforces 
geographical market segmentation.219 
We will consider two broad categories of cases. The first category draws 
attention to the relationship between copyright and contract. The right to control 
use of or access to a work or other subject matter in which copyright subsists is 
not one of the exclusive rights comprised within copyright. However, this has not 
prevented copyright owners from using contracts220 to impose restrictions on use 
and access of digital material, and using DRM to enforce those restrictions. 
These restrictions often go beyond the exclusive rights granted to copyright 
holders. The terms of such contracts are almost universally on a ‘take it or leave 
it’ basis, notwithstanding the contract law notion that a contract is a voluntary 
bargain between two parties. Consumers (and competitors) have no choice but to 
accept the imposition of restrictive conditions in licences if they want access to 
content. 
Lexmark falls into this category. It will be recalled that the prebate cartridges 
were sold in packaging carrying a purported contractual agreement on the carton, 
which contained a condition that the cartridge would be used only once, and the 
empty cartridge then returned to Lexmark.221 
In the second category of cases, there is no contractual restriction. DRM is 
used in isolation to achieve the same ends, including by impeding the lawful uses 
of consumers’ chattels.222 Chamberlain is an example of this type of case. In that 
case, there was no express restriction on a customer’s ability to use a 
non-Chamberlain remote control to operate their garage doors, but their rolling 
code software had the same effect, rendering competing remote controls 
incompatible with the Chamberlain door opener. 
A  Market Definition: Separate Markets or One Cluster Market? 
The need for interoperability is a feature of many markets. This is especially so 
in the computer industry and other high technology industries such as 
telecommunications. Hardware and software companies can use DRM to lock 
out their competitors’ products by preventing interoperation.  
Markets for complements (‘aftermarkets’) also lend themselves to this kind of 
control. For the purposes of competition law, a critical preliminary issue is to 
decide whether there is one market, which includes a durable piece of equipment 
and complementary spare parts and service, or whether there are multiple 
markets, consisting of a ‘primary’ market, for the durable piece of equipment 
(motor vehicle, computer hardware, printer) and a number of complementary or 
‘secondary’ markets (such as spare parts or toner cartridges) in which the 
manufacturer of the primary product competes with third-party suppliers.  
Consider the case of motor vehicle manufacturers. They have an advantage 
because they are generally vertically integrated, supplying in both the primary 
 
219 Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General, ‘DVDs, CDs and Computer Games: Good News for 
Consumers, Bad News for Pirates’ (Press Release, 4 September 2006). 
220 See, eg, EULAs, which have become ubiquitous in the market for commercial computer 
software. 
221 Lexmark, 387 F 3d 522, 530 (Sutton J) (6th Cir, 2004). See above n 129 and accompanying text. 
222 Stevens v Sony (2005) 224 CLR 193, 255 (Kirby J). 
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and secondary markets. This advantage is amplified by the advent of DRM. 
Thus, in selling spare parts which contain some amount of material protected by 
copyright (such as navigation systems, anti-lock brakes, ignition systems and 
emission controls), DRM can be used to prevent interoperation with 
‘non-genuine’ parts. In this way, third-party suppliers can be locked out of the 
secondary markets. 
Two theories have been advanced to explain the conduct of buyers in 
aftermarkets.223 According to the first theory, buyers of original equipment are 
sophisticated and have access to sufficient information to make an assessment of 
‘whole life’ costs (equipment plus parts and service) at the time of purchase. This 
limits the ability of the equipment manufacturer to charge high prices for parts 
and service. Thus, if there is competition in the primary market for the original 
equipment, this implies that there will be competition in the aftermarkets and 
both markets constitute the one relevant market for competition law purposes. 
According to the second theory, buyers are unable to assess ‘whole life’ costs 
at the time of purchase. The existence of high switching costs means the seller of 
the original equipment can ‘hold up’ customers, who are locked in for as long as 
they use the original equipment. In this case, there are separate relevant markets 
for the original equipment, spare parts and repair services. 
The second theory was adopted in the Kodak photocopier case, Eastman 
Kodak Co v Technical Services Inc,224 in the US. The Eastman Kodak Co 
(‘Kodak’) held 220 patents covering spare parts required to service its machines. 
Originally it cooperated with independent service organisations (‘ISOs’) which 
repaired and serviced its photocopiers and they flourished. Subsequently, Kodak 
adopted a more restrictive policy in relation to the servicing of its equipment and 
withdrew its cooperation. It sold replacement parts only to owners of Kodak 
equipment who serviced the equipment themselves or used Kodak’s service. The 
District Court granted summary judgment in Kodak’s favour.225 The Court of 
Appeals reversed this finding.226 The US Supreme Court affirmed the Court of 
Appeals.227  
The Supreme Court rejected Kodak’s central argument that competition in the 
primary market precluded market power in the aftermarket. The Court accepted 
that where consumers face significant information and switching costs, they are 
locked into a particular brand of equipment.228 The Court concluded: 
In the end, of course, Kodak’s arguments may prove to be correct. It may be 
that its parts, service, and equipment are components of one unified market, or 
that the equipment market doesn’t discipline the aftermarkets so that all three 
are priced competitively overall, or that any anticompetitive effects of Kodak’s 
 
223 See Cento G Veljanovski, ‘Competition Law Issues in the Computer Industry: An Economic 
Perspective’ (2003) 3 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 3, 20–1. 
224 504 US 451 (1992). 
225 Image Technical Services Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, No C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 
17218 (ND Cal, 1988). 
226 Image Technical Service Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 903 F 2d 612 (9th Cir, 1990). 
227 Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc, 504 US 451 (1992). 
228 Ibid 476 (Blackmun J). 
     
2006] Locking In Customers, Locking Out Competitors 693 
     
behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects. But we cannot reach these 
conclusions as a matter of law on a record this sparse.229 
The Supreme Court stated: 
The Court has held many times that power gained through some natural and 
legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to 
liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his 
empire into the next’.230 
On remand, Kodak was found by the District Court to have used its monopoly 
over Kodak parts to gain a monopoly over the service of Kodak equipment 
contrary to § 2 of the Sherman Act.231 This was confirmed on appeal.232 The 
Ninth Circuit devised a ‘single monopoly’ theory for patents, under which the 
patentee is entitled to only one monopoly. While the patents may have given 
Kodak a monopoly in relation to some of the parts, Kodak was creating a second 
monopoly in the service market by refusing to sell the parts to ISOs.233 
Switching to a new product may entail transaction costs and learning costs. 
There may also be contractual disincentives which make it more difficult for 
customers to switch. Massimo Motta observes: 
the existence of switching costs effectively differentiates goods that would 
otherwise be perceived as perfectly identical. One might be perfectly 
indifferent, before opening a bank account, between two banks that charge 
similar rates and give similar services. However, after having opened an 
account at a particular bank, the existence of switching costs would make it 
worth changing banks only if the alternative bank will give much better rates or 
services. Products that are ex ante identical after a purchase become ex post 
differentiated.234 
The question whether there was a separate, secondary market for 
brand-specific spare parts arose in Australia in Regents Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) 
Pty Ltd.235 
It was alleged that Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (‘Subaru’) had misused its market 
power contrary to s 46 of the TPA by terminating Regents Pty Ltd’s (‘Regents’) 
distributorship, and thereafter refusing both to supply it with genuine Subaru 
spare parts and to authorise it to resell such parts and service Subaru cars. The 
applicant’s case depended on a finding that there were separate markets for cars 
and Subaru parts. The respondents contended that there was only one relevant 
market: that for the sale of cars and ancillary services. 
Nicholson J adopted the first theory set out above and concluded that there was 
only one relevant market: namely, that for the supply of motor vehicles, parts and 
 
229 Ibid 486 (Blackmun J). 
230 Ibid 479 (Blackmun J), citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co v United States, 345 US 594, 611 
(Clark J) (1953). 
231 Image Technical Service Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, No C 87-1686 AWT, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 
2386 (ND Cal, 1996). 
232 Image Technical Services Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 125 F 3d 1195 (9th Cir, 1997). 
233 Ibid 1216 (Beezer J).  
234 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (2004) 79 (emphasis in original). 
235 (1998) 84 FCR 218 (‘Regents v Subaru’). 
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ancillary services. The aftermarket was merely a sub-market of this broader 
market. 
The existence of a separate Subaru parts aftermarket depended on the 
‘commercial realities’ faced by consumers.236 Nicholson J found that the 
respondent’s contentions regarding the relevant product market could be made 
out on the basis of the following evidence: 
• There was evidence of cross-elasticity of demand and supply at the wholesale 
level. If the price of Subaru parts was raised, buyers (retailers of parts) 
switched their patronage to other brands of cars or parts, or to non-genuine 
parts. On the supply side, manufacturers of Subaru parts and non-genuine 
parts could adjust their production plans.237 
• There was also evidence of cross-elasticity of supply and demand at the retail 
level. Non-genuine parts were not available for the majority of Subaru lines 
(81 per cent), so that substitution only took place in a few lines. However, 
these few lines were the high volume lines and there was evidence of strong 
substitution.238 
• As regards the interrelationship between cars and the parts market, it was 
established that the gross profit margin on parts was around 50 per cent while 
the margin on the sale of motor vehicles was only between seven to 14 per 
cent. There were two reasons for the substantial difference in profit margins: 
first, the close and vigorous competition in relation to the supply of new 
motor vehicles; and second, the absence of competition in relation to Subaru 
parts.239 
His Honour concluded: 
the high prices of Subaru spare parts result from substantial regard by the 
respondent to prices of such parts in relation to other marques of cars. It is not 
therefore open to the inference that the prices only exist due to lack of 
competition in the market for Subaru parts. Rather the price results from the 
pricing of parts being competitive with other marques of cars and parts. That is 
a competition evidencing the interconnection and complementarity of the cars 
and parts markets, as the case for the respondent contends.240 
Thus, while the parts of other car manufacturers were not physically 
substitutable for Subaru parts, Subaru, in pricing its parts, nevertheless had 
regard to the prices of parts for other makes of cars to ensure that consumers did 
not reject Subaru cars because Subaru parts were too expensive.241 
In Australia, since the introduction of s 4E of the TPA, courts have applied the 
economic test in defining markets and have rejected attempts to define markets 
 
236 Ibid 228–9 (Nicholson J). 
237 Ibid 236 (Nicholson J). 
238 Ibid 236–7. 
239 Ibid 237. 
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241 Ibid 236–7. 
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in terms of a single trademarked product such as Salomon ski boots,242 Toyota 
brand vehicles,243 or a single copyright work.244 
The courts have not, however, rejected the possibility that a single brand 
product may constitute a separate economic market. In Melway Publishing Pty 
Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd,245 the holding of the trial judge — that ‘there is a 
separate directory market in each major city’246 and that the Melbourne one was 
dominated by the Melway Street Directory,247 a copyrighted product — was 
upheld on appeal to the High Court.248 
Original equipment, parts and service are likely to comprise one relevant 
market (a ‘cluster market’) for the purposes of competition law in the following 
circumstances: 
1 there is effective competition in the market for the original equipment;249 
2 there is sufficient information available to customers to allow them to predict 
‘whole life’ costs at the time of purchase of the original equipment;250 
3 there are low switching costs;251 and 
4 the original equipment has a short life and high turnover by customers. 
However, these factors cannot conclusively establish that a cluster market 
exists. In Regents v Subaru, Nicholson J acknowledged that: 
Whether dealings in a particular product can constitute a market will depend on 
whether the circumstances require the market to be more broadly delineated. 
This in turn will depend on whether the concept of substitutability leads in 
reality and in the long run to coverage of a wider field.252 
His Honour also acknowledged that ‘[s]pare parts not readily interchangeable for 
those of other machines may … lead to the finding of the existence of such a 
market.’253 
His Honour cited Hugin Kassaregister AB v Commission of the European 
Communities254 as authority for this proposition.255 In Hugin, the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities held that a Swedish company, Hugin 
Kassaregister AB, and its British subsidiary, Hugin Cash Registers Pty Ltd 
(jointly ‘Hugin’), occupied a dominant position in the market for the supply of 
 
242 Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 581. 
243 J Ah Toy Pty Ltd v Thiess Toyota Pty Ltd (1980) 3 ATPR ¶40-155. 
244 Broderbund Software Inc v Computermate Products (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 22 IPR 215 
(‘Broderbund’). 
245 (2001) 205 CLR 1. 
246 Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (t/as Auto Fashions Australia) v Melway Publishing Pty Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 
627, 638 (Merkel J). 
247 Ibid 639–40 (Merkel J). 
248 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 34 (Kirby J). 
249 Regents v Subaru (1998) 84 FCR 218, 236 (Nicholson J). 
250 Ibid 235 (Nicholson J). 
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parts for their cash registers,256 because these parts were not interchangeable 
with parts from other brands and could not otherwise be economically 
reproduced,257 even though Hugin had only 12 per cent of the market for cash 
registers within the European Communities.258 
That a manufacturer can be dominant in the supply of its own spare parts was 
implicit in the European Court of Justice’s judgments in Volvo AB v Erik Veng 
(UK) Ltd259 and Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per 
Autoveicoli v Régie Nationale des Usines Renault,260 both of which involved the 
use of IP rights to preclude competition in the market for spare parts for certain 
brands of vehicles. 
Nicholson J distinguished the situation in Regents v Subaru from these 
overseas authorities because of the ‘degree of wholesale and retail 
substitutability and complementarity of the parts and cars.’261 
In a case such as Lexmark where DRM is used to completely eliminate 
substitute products, the ‘commercial reality’ for consumers is that a separate 
market for brand-compatible products will probably exist. 
Cento G Veljanovski has identified a number of factors which, if all or most 
are present, may suggest that a cluster market exists. These factors include: 
• effective competition in the market for the durable product; 
• a high proportion of current to historical sales of the durable product; 
• the initial purchasers’ knowledge of, and ability to predict, ‘whole life’ costs; 
• transparent costs for complementary products; 
• many repeat purchasers; 
• low switching costs; 
• competition in the market for complementary products; and 
• a high degree of technical change leading to short life of equipment.262 
B  DRM Technology as a Separate Market 
In many cases, it is likely that a separate market will exist for DRM technology 
itself. Such a market can exist even without actual trade in DRM technology 
within that market. In Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill 
Proprietary Co Ltd,263 three judges of the High Court (Deane, Dawson and 
Toohey JJ) held that actual trade is not required to establish that a market exists. 
Deane J (with whom Dawson J agreed generally) held that ‘a market may exist 
… if there exists a demand for (and the potential for competition between traders 
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in) such goods at that level, notwithstanding that there is no supplier of, nor trade 
in, those goods at a given time’.264 
Dawson J elaborated on this in his concurring judgment: 
The existence or non-existence of sales of a product cannot conclude whether a 
market exists or not. It must be sufficient to constitute a market that there is a 
product for exchange, regardless of whether exchange or negotiation for 
exchange has actually taken place.265 
Toohey J relied in his judgment on a broader market for steel and steel 
products, but noted that if it were necessary to consider a market for the 
particular steel product in issue, ‘the absence of existing buyers does not mean 
that there is no market for [the product].’266 
This approach has been adopted by the Full Federal Court in subsequent 
cases,267 and confirmed by the High Court in NT Power Generation Pty 
Ltd v Power and Water Authority.268 Where a DRM technology or class of 
technologies exist, and there is a demand or potential demand for access to it, 
this will be sufficient to establish a market for competition law purposes, even 
where the DRM owner has not and will not sell or allow others access to it. 
In the VirginMega Case,269 the French competition authority held that there 
were three relevant markets: a market for DRM for music; a market for portable 
digital music playing devices; and a market for the online sale of downloadable 
music.270 In the market for DRM for music, Apple’s FairPlay DRM system 
competes with other systems, including the Microsoft Windows Media Audio 
(‘WMA’) DRM system. Microsoft integrates its WMA DRM system with the 
Microsoft Windows operating system, which is used on the vast majority of PCs 
in the world, giving the Microsoft DRM system a massive installed base of users. 
The European Commission had previously referred to Microsoft as having a 
‘leading position in the DRM solutions market.’271 For these reasons, the French 
competition authority considered it unlikely that Apple held sufficient market 
share to give it a dominant position in the market for DRM.272 
If, owing to incompatibilities between DRM systems, consumer behaviour, or 
‘commercial realities’, the market had been defined more narrowly (as a market 
for FairPlay-compatible DRM systems), Apple would almost certainly have 
substantial market power within that market. 
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C  Supply Subject to Restrictive Conditions — Section 47(2) 
Section 47(2) of the TPA includes within the practice of exclusive dealing 
conditions which restrict a buyer from acquiring goods or services from a 
competitor of the supplier. Section 47(2) provides: 
A corporation engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation — 
(a) supplies … goods or services;  
(b) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services at a particular price; or 
(c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount, allowance, 
rebate or credit in relation to the supply of goods or services by the 
corporation; 
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies … goods or 
services … 
(d) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, acquire goods or 
services … directly or indirectly from a competitor of the corporation 
…; or 
(f) in the case where the corporation supplies … goods or services, will 
not re-supply the goods or services to any person, or will not, or will 
not except to a limited extent, re-supply the goods or services: 
(i) to particular persons or classes of persons or to persons other 
than particular persons or classes of persons … 
The conduct in Lexmark would fall within s 47(2)(b) or (c) and s 47(2)(d) or 
(f), in that Lexmark supplied toner cartridges at a particular price,273 or gave a 
discount or allowance (the prebate),274 but: 
1 on the express contractual condition that the customer would not acquire the 
services of a cartridge remanufacturer to refill the cartridge;275 
2 on the express contractual condition that the customer would not resupply the 
empty toner cartridge to anyone other than Lexmark;276 and 
3 on the implied condition that the customer would not acquire remanufactured 
cartridges from remanufacturers.277 
In order to fall within the definition of ‘exclusive dealing’ in s 47(2)(d), it is 
sufficient that the condition is implied and not legally enforceable. The High 
Court observed in Visy Paper Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission278 that the word ‘condition’ in s 47 has a meaning ‘uncircumscribed 
by contract law notions’.279 
This is clear from s 47(13)(a), which provides: 
A reference to a condition shall be read as a reference to any condition, whether 
direct or indirect and whether having legal or equitable force or not, and 
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includes a reference to a condition the existence or nature of which is 
ascertainable only by inference from the conduct of persons or from other 
relevant circumstances. 
While a ‘condition’ for the purposes of s 47 need not necessarily have legal or 
equitable force, it must involve more than a mere hope or expectation.280 The 
implied condition described above (Point 3) might fall into the category of a 
‘mere hope or expectation’ but the express contractual provisions on the carton 
containing the toner cartridge would almost certainly be a ‘condition’ within the 
meaning of s 47. 
D  Does the Condition Have the Purpose, or Likely Effect, of Substantially 
Lessening Competition? 
To be prohibited by s 47, the condition must have the purpose or likely effect 
of substantially lessening competition.281 In assessing this, the first step is to 
define the relevant market in which the competition occurs. The substantial 
lessening of competition test focuses on the likely future conduct of firms in the 
market on a ‘with’ and ‘without’ basis. In the words of the Trade Practices 
Tribunal (now the Australian Competition Tribunal) in Re Queensland 
Co-Operative Milling Association Ltd,282 it is necessary to ask: will the conduct 
at issue allow the parties to ‘give less and charge more’?283 The essential 
question is not whether ‘the conduct harms competitors’, but ‘how might the 
conduct harm consumers’? 
In assessing the effect or likely effect of a restrictive condition in a licence, it is 
necessary to ask: what is likely to happen in the future with the condition (‘the 
factual’), and what is likely to happen in the future without the condition (‘the 
counterfactual’).284 The proper question to ask is therefore: ‘looking into the 
future, will the condition reduce competition that would otherwise have existed 
in the market but for the condition?’285 
In Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission,286 the Full Federal Court found that the conduct of Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd (‘Universal’) and Warner Music Australia Pty Ltd (‘Warner’) 
in seeking to dissuade retailers from selling imported stock fell within the 
definition of ‘exclusive dealing’. Communications by Universal and Warner with 
retailers as to the terms of trade were characterised as supply on the condition 
that the retailers would not acquire non-infringing copies from a competitor, and 
as a refusal to supply if retailers acquired non-infringing copies from a 
competitor. 
 
280 SWB Family Credit Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 365. 
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282 (1976) 25 FLR 169. 
283 Ibid 190 (Woodward P, Members Shipton and Brunt). 
284 Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments [No 6] Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 667; 
Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd (ACN 008 767 600) v Bunbury Port Authority (2000) 22 ATPR 
¶41-783, 41 267 (Burchett and Hely JJ), 41 279 (Carr J) (‘Stirling Harbour Services’). 
285 Stirling Harbour Services (2000) 22 ATPR ¶41-783, 41 267 (Burchett and Hely JJ), 41 279 
(Carr J). 
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The Full Federal Court held that the conduct did not have the effect or likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition. The evidence was that many 
retailers purchased non-infringing copies either by direct importation or by 
purchasing stock imported by others. Accordingly, the conduct did not have the 
effect of substantially lessening competition.287 This may have been because it 
was ‘nipped in the bud’ by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission’s (‘ACCC’) intervention, or the fact that many retailers were not 
intimidated by the threats. 
However, the Full Federal Court held that it did have the proscribed purpose of 
substantially lessening competition. By dissuading retailers from purchasing 
imported stock they were able to restrict intra-brand competition in relation to 
their own CD titles even though there was evidence of inter-brand competition 
with CD titles of other suppliers. 
Each of the appellants was responsible for a sixth of the total CDs sold 
wholesale in Australia. The Full Federal Court held: 
In the case of a true commodity, such as wheat, elimination of competition from 
a supplier holding one-sixth of the market might have little effect on 
competition in that market; the customers might simply transfer their business 
to the remaining five suppliers in the market, who might compete fiercely for 
that business. However, CD titles are not an homogeneous commodity. Each is 
unique. Each appeals to a different audience, although audiences overlap. If 
intra-brand competition is eliminated, there is no direct price competition or 
any direct competition in relation to the aggregation of unique titles. Of course, 
each title is in competition with the titles of other suppliers in the same market 
and that, over time, would impose some competitive pressure. However, if a 
major supplier could hold the line against intra-brand competition from 
imports, it could determine in its own time whether to respond to competition 
from other suppliers and, if so, how to do this. We are satisfied this comfortable 
situation would apply to a significant proportion of the available titles, and 
amount to a substantial lessening of competition …288 
In Lexmark, the effect of the contractual conditions was to deny cartridge 
remanufacturers an essential input ingredient (empty toner cartridges), and the 
effect of the DRM was to prevent customers from using remanufactured 
cartridges in their printers. But what was the purpose of these measures? 
Lexmark could have undoubtedly claimed reasonable commercial motives for 
their conduct. The prebate programme could be justified as a response to 
customer dissatisfaction with the previous rebate programme, and the DRM 
justified to protect Lexmark from dishonest diversion of cartridges on which the 
prebate had been given. 
 
287 Ibid 586 (Wilcox, French and Gyles JJ). 
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For a condition to offend against s 47 because its purpose was to substantially 
lessen competition, that need not be its only purpose. Section 4F(1)(b) of the TPA 
provides that for the purposes of the TPA: 
a person shall be deemed to have engaged or to engage in conduct for a 
particular purpose or a particular reason if: 
(i) the person engaged or engages in the conduct for purposes that 
included or include that purpose or for reasons that included or 
include that reason, as the case may be; and 
(ii) that purpose or reason was or is a substantial purpose or reason. 
It would then be sufficient that one of Lexmark’s purposes was to lessen 
competition substantially, even if they also had legitimate purposes in mind, so 
long as lessening competition was a substantial or operative purpose.289 
E  Supply Subject Only to Technical Restrictions, or Refusal To Supply — 
Section 46(1) 
In the second category of cases, there are no restrictive conditions but the same 
effect is achieved by technical means: namely, DRM technology that locks out 
competitors. In order to get access or ensure interoperability, a competing 
supplier will need a licence of the DRM technology. Unilateral refusal to license 
by the supplier can only be challenged as a violation of s 46 of the TPA. In order 
to establish a contravention of s 46 it is necessary to establish three elements: 
1 the respondent had a substantial degree of market power at the time that it 
engaged in the conduct; 
2 the respondent took advantage of its market power when it engaged in the 
conduct; and 
3 the respondent engaged in the conduct for one of the subjective 
anti-competitive purposes set out in s 46(1). 
F  Does Ownership of IP Rights Confer Market Power? 
The High Court noted in NT Power that IP rights are often a very clear source 
of market power.290 The High Court did not elaborate upon this statement. In a 
situation involving aftermarkets (such as in Regents v Subaru or Lexmark), the 
most important factor in determining the existence of substantial market power 
will be how the relevant market is defined. 
If the relevant market is a non-brand specific cluster market (as found in 
Regents v Subaru), then a traditional analysis of market power is required. If, on 
the other hand, a separate market for brand-specific parts or consumables is 
 
289 In Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (1999) 90 FCR 128, Melway Publishing 
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Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 20 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ). 
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found (for example, toner cartridges for Lexmark printers or spare parts for 
Subaru cars), then in the absence of actual or potential competition in those 
markets, a finding of substantial market power on the part of the brand-owner 
will probably follow. This is especially so when DRM has been used to exclude 
competitors and ensure that the brand-owner is the only supplier within that 
market. 
In Queensland Wire, Mason CJ and Wilson J defined ‘market power’ as ‘the 
ability of a firm to raise prices above the supply cost without rivals taking away 
customers in due time, supply cost being the minimum cost an efficient firm 
would incur in producing the product’.291 The words ‘in due time’ are 
significant. The existence of market power is to be tested not by reference to any 
short-term influence on price, but rather by reference to the longer run. Two 
cases have considered the issue of the time period over which to assess whether a 
supplier has the ability to raise prices above supply cost without losing business 
to another supplier. 
In the Universal Music Case,292 the issue was whether the major record 
companies, Universal and Warner, had contravened s 46 in refusing to supply 
stock to retailers who sold imported CDs. The trial judge, Hill J, concluded that a 
market share of between 15–18 per cent, combined with a number of other 
factors including product differentiation, could amount to a substantial degree of 
market power for the purposes of s 46(1).293 This finding was overturned on 
appeal by the Full Federal Court.294 
Professor Jerry Hausman, the economist for Universal and Warner, defined 
market power to mean ‘the ability of a firm to charge a price significantly above 
the competitive level for a non-transitory period of time’.295 He argued that 
Universal and Warner were not able to raise their prices for CDs above the 
competitive level because they were constrained by other competing record 
companies in their price setting. If either sought to raise prices, consumers would 
switch and purchase the CDs of their competitors. They were also constrained by 
the countervailing power of large buyers (such as Sanity and HMV) who were 
able to extract large discounts and other favourable terms of trade by threatening 
not to buy Universal or Warner CDs. 
It was held that there were no significant barriers to entry to the record 
industry generally. This was demonstrated by evidence of new entry by 
independent recording companies from time to time. Production costs for CDs 
were relatively low. Publicity and promotion costs were the most significant item 
of expenditure. Hill J concluded that ‘Universal and Warner had each a 
substantial degree of market power in the market by virtue of each having hits or 
back catalogue’296 which retailers needed to be able to stock: 
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I find the issue of market power and its related issue of barriers to entry 
extremely difficult to decide. It is really at the heart of the controversy between 
the parties. The case of a firm acting in an oligopolistic market with only 15 per 
cent market share and unable to fix prices in the overall market above the 
competitive level but which has, as a result of a temporary monopoly power 
over a limited number of products in that market, substantial power to exclude 
competitors is not one which has been the subject of any authority in Australia 
or, so far as my researches indicate, in any other country.297 
The Full Federal Court, comprising Wilcox, French and Gyles JJ, disagreed, 
holding that the issue of substantial market power is not to be tested by reference 
to whether a firm can engage in anti-competitive conduct or incidents of abuse of 
market power, since all participants in a market have some degree of market 
power which may, on occasion, enable them to engage in anti-competitive 
conduct.298 The central question is whether the firm has persistent market power 
rather than temporary market power. 
The Court accepted the findings of Hill J that it was ‘commercially imperative’ 
for retailers to stock the Australian catalogue of each of the major distributors 
and that a refusal to supply would cause a retailer considerable inconvenience 
and loss of sales and profits.299 However, this was not enough to demonstrate 
substantial market power. The Full Court held that ‘[m]arket power is judged by 
reference to persistent rather than temporary conditions.’300 
A similar view about the need to assess market power over the longer term was 
taken by French J in Australian Gas Light Co v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission [No 3].301 
Copyright law protects the expression of an idea. It prevents the literal copying 
of the creative work. It does not prevent others from creating or distributing 
similar works. Copyright does not confer a great deal of market power. There are 
often substitutes for any given book or computer program. 
In Broderbund,302 it was argued that a computer software program was a 
unique product market. The software program, Where in the World is Carmen 
Sandiego? (‘Carmen Sandiego’), was a piece of educational software. 
Beaumont J found that Broderbund Software Inc’s market share was in the range 
of 10–17 per cent. His Honour accepted evidence that there were many 
alternative educational games which were used to develop some of the skills 
claimed to be developed by the Carmen Sandiego software.303 
To establish substantial market power in a cluster market, it would be 
necessary to demonstrate that the TPM in question had become the industry 
standard, or had genuinely unique features such that it was almost an ‘essential 
facility’. 
In summary, determining the existence of substantial market power in a broad 
cluster market requires an analysis of the structure of the market and, in 
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particular, barriers to entry over the longer term. Even in a competitive market 
structure, a firm may enjoy temporary market power because of a lack of 
information about price variations between suppliers. In the longer term, 
however, such price variations will tend towards uniformity. A position of 
substantial market power requires the existence of long-run barriers to 
competition and, as French J found in the AGL Case,304 the time frame for such 
an assessment is years rather than months. 
If the relevant market is instead a market for brand-specific parts or 
consumables, where DRM is used to preclude competition, the brand owner will 
almost certainly have substantial market power. 
G  The ‘Taking Advantage’ Element 
There must be a causal link between the conduct at issue and the respondent’s 
market power, in the sense that the conduct necessarily involves a use of the 
market power. This is tested by means of the counterfactual approach, according 
to which one asks whether the respondent could or would be likely to engage in 
the conduct under competitive conditions. If a firm acting under competitive 
conditions could or would engage in the same conduct, then there is no necessary 
link between the conduct and the respondent’s market power. 
Whether the exercise of an exclusive right comprised within copyright can 
constitute taking advantage of market power in Australia was considered in 
Broderbund.305 In considering this issue, Beaumont J made extensive reference 
to the decision of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities in 
Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission of the European 
Communities.306 In that decision, the Court of First Instance characterised the 
conduct of the applicant as ‘using its copyright … in order to secure a monopoly 
in the derivative market’307 and said that: 
Conduct of that type — characterized by preventing the production and 
marketing of a new product, for which there is potential consumer demand … 
and thereby excluding all competition from that market solely in order to secure 
the applicant’s monopoly — clearly goes beyond what is necessary to fulfil the 
essential function of the copyright as permitted in Community law.308 
Beaumont J distinguished the situation in Broderbund (involving the parallel 
importation of computer software) from the Magill Case, and held in obiter dicta 
that use of the exclusive right to control importation did not constitute taking 
advantage of market power.309 
This decision may seem problematic for the use of s 46 to address the misuse 
of DRM technology, but those situations can be distinguished from Broderbund 
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on several grounds. First, there is no statutory right for copyright owners to use 
DRM to protect their copyright — the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) merely provides 
certain protections for any such DRM employed, if it is a TPM within the 
meaning of the Act. 
Second, and most importantly, the controlling of access to or use of copyright 
material is not an exclusive right comprised within copyright. The use of DRM 
to control access to or use of copyright material in order to secure a monopoly 
over complementary products, such as that which occurred in Lexmark and 
Chamberlain, is a misuse of copyright law more analogous to the Magill Case 
than to Broderbund. 
1 Counterfactual Test — Consumer Lock-In 
Cases such as Lexmark and Chamberlain involve companies (the ‘original 
manufacturer’) who produce durable consumer products (laser printers and 
garage door openers) and design those products to lock in consumers by ensuring 
that competitors will be unable to produce complementary products (toner 
cartridges and remote controls) that will work with the durable product. Could or 
would a company operating under competitive conditions engage in such 
conduct? 
There are obvious financial benefits to locking in customers. Customers 
requiring complementary products will have no alternative other than to 
purchase from the original manufacturer, at whatever price and on whatever 
terms the original manufacturer sees fit. Lock-in provides a commercial 
temptation to exploit those who have already purchased the durable product, a 
practice sometimes called ‘installed user opportunism’.310 Where the lifespan of 
the durable product is long, this will result in a level of long-term guaranteed 
business. 
Locking in customers may also have negative effects. Customers affected by a 
lock-in, usually by having to purchase complementary products at ‘monopoly 
rent’ pricing, may become dissatisfied with the original manufacturer’s products. 
They may choose to change brands when making future purchases of durable 
products. Where potential buyers of the durable products have good information 
about the existence of the lock-in and their financial consequences, they may 
consider the ‘life cycle’ pricing and choose an alternative product. Where the 
lifespan of the durable products is long, the monopoly rents charged for 
complementary products over the life of the durable product may exceed the 
switching costs that would be incurred by replacing the durable product, causing 
the original manufacturer to lose market share. 
The increasing number of vendors in high technology markets who are 
engaging in consumer lock-ins might suggest that, in the final analysis, the 
benefits outweigh the costs. If this is the case, and the company could or would 
engage in the impugned conduct under competitive conditions, the company will 
not have taken advantage of its market power and there will have been no breach 
of TPA s 46(1). 
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2 Counterfactual Test — Refusal To License 
DRM technologies themselves are the subject of IP rights — such as 
copyright, patents and trade secrets — and the owner of a DRM technology may 
refuse to license those rights. However, the High Court has held that the refusal 
to license IP rights can constitute a misuse of market power and that this was 
clearly contemplated by Parliament in s 51(3) of the TPA.311 Could or would the 
owner of a DRM technology, in a competitive market, refuse to license? 
It seems unlikely. The market for DRM technologies, like many high 
technology markets, is subject to strong network effects and ‘tipping’. A network 
effect exists when, other things being equal, a consumer would prefer to join a 
larger, rather than a smaller network.312 Tipping occurs when a supplier gains 
dominance not because of the superiority of their product, but because it attains a 
critical mass at which consumers — who would have otherwise purchased from 
a competitor — shift towards it in large numbers.313 
As applied to competitive markets for DRM technologies, other things being 
equal, consumers are likely to use a DRM technology which has the widest range 
of content available using that DRM, and content providers are likely to use the 
DRM which has the most number of consumers using it. 
For this reason, it is important for DRM vendors to license their DRM 
technology as widely as possible.314 Failure to do so would subject vendors to 
the risk of losing substantial market share to competitors with more liberal 
licensing terms. Network effects can also act as an incentive to create 
interoperable DRM systems between different DRM vendors.315 Where different 
DRM systems are interconnected and interoperable, consumers and vendors will 
reap the benefits of having a larger network.316 
The number of viable DRM systems will depend on the significance and 
nature of the network benefits function, other factors being equal. If the network 
effects are exhausted at user numbers which are far less than the potential 
market, then, in the presence of network effects, more than one DRM system will 
be sustainable.317 
There is no necessary reason to assume that network effects will necessarily 
lead to tipping and an eventual natural monopoly.318 However, the history of 
high technology markets, especially those driven by the entertainment industry, 
shows that they tend towards tipping and the emergence of a monopoly product 
market.319 
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Once the installed base of a particular DRM reaches the critical mass and 
tipping occurs, other DRM vendors are likely to be relegated to, at best, marginal 
positions in the market. 
Notwithstanding the above, there may be a significant commercial justification 
for refusing to license a DRM technology. Copyright holders whose works are 
protected by the DRM may impose conditions on the DRM vendor, restricting or 
preventing their ability to license the DRM. This is more likely where the DRM 
vendor is vertically integrated, producing not only the DRM, but selling the 
DRM-protected content under licence, and also producing the DRM-compatible 
software and hardware used to access the content. One example of this is Apple, 
which produces the FairPlay DRM technology, sells the FairPlay-protected 
content under licence via the iTunes Music Store, and produces iTunes and 
iPods, the only FairPlay-compatible software and hardware capable of accessing 
that content. 
A particularly aggressive competitor could adopt a ‘winner takes all’ strategy, 
where they refuse to license or interconnect, and compete aggressively by 
offering an exclusive and incompatible DRM system to consumers. Such a 
strategy could be viewed as either pro-competitive (by causing vigorous 
competition in the market), or alternatively, as an abuse of market power 
designed to foreclose the market to smaller competitors.320 
3 Summary 
Whether a company could or would engage in the impugned conduct under 
competitive market conditions is a question of fact and will be heavily dependant 
on the circumstances of the individual case. While it is not possible to set down 
firm guidelines, it is perhaps more likely that the refusal to license DRM 
technology would constitute taking advantage of market power, than the mere 
creation of consumer lock-ins. 
H  Proscribed Purpose 
Finally, the taking advantage of market power must be for one of the 
proscribed purposes in TPA s 46(1), namely: 
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation … 
in that or any other market; 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in 
that or any other market. 
A proscribed purpose need not be proven; it may be inferred by the court from 
the conduct of the corporation or from other relevant circumstances.321 A 
proscribed purpose need not be the sole purpose of the corporation; as previously 
discussed in the context of exclusive dealing, it is sufficient that a proscribed 
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purpose be one of many purposes, so long as it is a substantial or operative 
purpose.322 
I  Conclusion 
The substantive prohibitions in Part IV of the TPA may apply to 
anti-competitive conduct in connection with DRM technologies. The definition 
of the scope of the relevant markets will be critical and is likely to determine the 
success or failure of any actions under Part IV. Expert evidence as to the nature 
of the markets concerned, including consumer behaviour and the degree of 
substitutability within the markets, will be the key to a successful case. 
1 Section 51(3) 
Section 51(3) operates as an exception to some provisions of Part IV of the 
TPA, for certain conditions in licences or assignments of certain IP rights, 
including copyright and patents. Section 51(3) provides: 
A contravention of a provision of this Part other than section 46, 46A or 48 
shall not be taken to have been committed by reason of: 
(a) the imposing of, or giving effect to, a condition of: 
(i) a licence granted by the proprietor, licensee or owner of a 
patent, of a registered design, of a copyright or of EL rights 
within the meaning of the Circuit Layouts Act 1989, or by a 
person who has applied for a patent or for the registration of a 
design; or 
(ii) an assignment of a patent, of a registered design, of a 
copyright or of such EL rights, or of the right to apply for a 
patent or for the registration of a design; 
to the extent that the condition relates to: 
(iii) the invention to which the patent or application for a patent 
relates or articles made by the use of that invention; 
(iv) goods in respect of which the design is, or is proposed to be, 
registered and to which it is applied; 
(v) the work or other subject matter in which the copyright 
subsists; or 
(vi) the eligible layout in which the EL rights subsist …323 
The only case to consider this exception is Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo 
International Ltd.324 In that case, Transfield Pty Ltd (‘Transfield’) entered into 
an exclusive sub-licence to make, use, exercise and vend a patented process for 
the construction of poles for electrical transmission. The licence contained a 
‘best endeavours’ clause, under which Transfield agreed to ‘energetically 
promote and develop the greatest possible market for the [patented] ARLO PTL 
pole.’325 
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The best endeavours clause was ‘a condition of … a licence granted by the 
proprietor … of a patent’,326 but did it relate to the invention to which the patent 
related, or to articles made by use of that invention? While the majority of the 
High Court in Transfield did not find it necessary to consider s 51(3), Mason and 
Wilson JJ held that the best endeavours clause did ‘relate to’ articles made by use 
of the patented invention, and that the clause fell within the s 51(3) exception. 
In his judgment, Mason J stated: 
In bridging the different policies of the Patents Act and the Trade Practices Act, 
s 51(3) recognizes that a patentee is justly entitled to impose conditions on the 
granting of a licence or assignment of a patent in order to protect the patentee’s 
legal monopoly. … Section 51(3) determines the scope of restrictions the 
patentee may properly impose on the use of the patent. Conditions which seek 
to gain advantages collateral to the patent are not covered by s 51(3).327 
The proper scope of ‘relates to’ within s 51(3) is still a matter of some 
controversy. Section 51(3) was reviewed by the National Competition Council 
(‘NCC’) in 1999.328 The NCC Review identified a range of alternative views on 
the meaning of the term: 
• a narrow reading, relating to IP or the goods produced using it if it relates 
directly to the goods produced; 
• an intermediate reading, relating to IP or goods produced using it if the 
condition seeks to protect and exploit the patentee’s exclusive rights or to 
secure an advantage that is not collateral to the patentee’s exclusive rights; 
and 
• a broad reading, relating to IP or goods produced using it unless it seeks to 
apply to an almost entirely unrelated transaction or arrangement.329 
The intermediate reading would permit restrictions such as territorial 
restrictions and best endeavours clauses to fall within s 51(3), and accords 
generally with the reasoning of Mason J in Transfield. The broad reading would 
give protection to conditions such as exclusive grant-backs and agreements not 
to challenge the validity of a licensed patent.330 
Despite the apparent breadth s 51(3), it does not give protection to many types 
of conduct which may be relevant in the context of DRM. Section 46 of the TPA 
(misuse of market power) is unaffected by s 51(3), as is s 48 (resale price 
maintenance). 
 
326 TPA s 51(3)(a)(i). 
327 Transfield (1980) 144 CLR 83, 102–3. 
328 NCC, Review of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Final Report (1999) 
186 (‘NCC Review’) <http://www.ncc.gov.au/articles/files/LESe-001.pdf>. 
329 Ibid 184. 
330 Ibid. 
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2 Resale Price Maintenance 
Although s 48 may not apply to some more traditional methods of licensing IP 
such as patents,331 it may have relevance in the licensing and distribution of 
copyright content.332 If a copyright holder licenses a distributor to distribute 
copyright material — that is, to license or sub-license the use of that material by 
end users — but at a price not less than a specified minimum, s 48 may apply. 
The specific acts of resale price maintenance proscribed in s 96 of the TPA in 
relation to the resale of goods also apply in relation to the resupply of services.333 
Resupply of services includes: 
(i) a supply of the original services to another person in an altered form or 
condition; and 
(ii) a supply to another person of other services that are substantially similar 
to the original services, and could not have been supplied if the original 
services had not been acquired by the person [the distributor] who 
acquired them from the original supplier [the licensor].334 
In such a situation, the distributor is arguably resupplying the services acquired 
from the licensor, and the licensor would have engaged in an act of resale price 
maintenance proscribed by s 48. 
3 Refusal To License 
Section 51(3) of the TPA protects conditions in licences. Where the impugned 
conduct is a refusal to license, there is no licence and s 51(3) will not be 
available.335 All the provisions of Part IV of the TPA could then potentially apply. 
If licensing was refused because the prospective licensee would not agree to 
anti-competitive restrictions336 that the licensor sought to impose, the refusal 
may contravene TPA s 47(3). 
4 Types of IP Not Covered 
Section 51(3) of the TPA applies to conditions in licences or assignments of 
certain types of IP which are protected by statute: namely patents, registered 
designs, copyrights, circuit layout rights and trade marks. Conditions in licences 
and assignments of any other types of IP — such as know-how, trade secrets and 
confidential information — will not be protected by s 51(3). 
This difference may be significant in the context of licensing of DRM systems, 
as nearly all such systems would contain elements of know-how, trade secrets 
and confidential information. Such licences would be open to scrutiny under TPA 
Part IV, to the extent that they deal with IP not protected by s 51(3). 
 
331 For example, if a patentee licenses the use of a patent to produce goods on the condition that the 
licensor not sell the goods at less than a minimum price, this would fall outside the definition of 
‘resale price maintenance’: TPA s 96. 
332 Although note the uncertainty as to the applicability of TPA s 51(3) to copyright material 
discussed in below Part III(I)(5). 
333 TPA s 96A. 
334 TPA s 4C(f). 
335 NCC, above n 328, 182. 
336 For example, restrictions on the licensee’s ability to deal with competitors of the licensor. 
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It has also been suggested that s 51(3) would protect only IP created pursuant 
to Australian statute, and that conditions in licences and assignments of overseas 
patents would not fall within s 51(3).337 
5 Application to Copyright 
Section 51(3) of the TPA has yet to be judicially considered as it applies to 
licences and assignments of copyright. Section 51(3)(a)(v) requires that the 
conditions must ‘relate to … the work or other subject matter in which the 
copyright subsists.’ Copyright does not subsist in reproductions or copies, but 
only in the works or subject matter in their first material form. Sam Ricketson 
suggests that to be within s 51(3), the condition must relate to the work or other 
subject matter in its first material form, rendering s 51(3) ‘virtually meaningless’ 
as it applies to copyright.338 Such a literal construction of s 51(3) has been 
criticised,339 but uncertainty as to the application of s 51(3) to copyright is likely 
to persist until the section is judicially considered or amended. 
6 Future Reform of Section 51(3) 
The NCC reviewed ss 51(2) and 51(3) of the TPA and delivered its report in 
March 1999. The NCC Review observed that the interpretation of s 51(3) 
remained to some extent uncertain due to residual ambiguity as to what types of 
contractual provisions might ‘relate to’ the IP or goods produced using it.340 The 
NCC Review recommended that s 51(3) be retained but amended to remove 
protection for ‘price and quantity restrictions and horizontal agreements.’341 
The Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (‘IPCRC’) 
considered this recommendation in their Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement.342 The IPCRC Review 
stated that: 
there are flaws in the drafting of s 51(3) that under any scenario would require 
amendment. Leaving aside drafting considerations, the Committee believes that 
the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the section, and the possibility that it 
may exempt virtually all agreements which touch on IP from relevant sections 
of the Trade Practices Act, make the current section inappropriate.343 
However, the IPCRC considered that the vast majority of IP licences could fall 
within the categories identified by the NCC,344 and that the adoption of the 
NCC’s recommendations would for that reason amount to a repeal of s 51(3).345 
 
337 W M C Gummow, ‘Abuse of Monopoly: Industrial Property and Trade Practices Control’ (1973) 
7 Sydney Law Review 339, 355. 
338 Lawbook Co, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Designs and Confidential 
Information, vol 2 (at 24) [15.190]. 
339 Trade Practices Commission, Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual Property 
(1991) 12. 
340 See NCC, above n 328, 15–23. 
341 Ibid 243. 
342 IPCRC, Australian Government, Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the 
Competition Principles Agreement (2000) (‘IPCRC Review’). 
343 Ibid 212. 
344 That is, price and quantity restrictions, and horizontal agreements. 
345 IPCRC, above n 342, 213. 
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The IPCRC instead recommended that s 51(3) itself be repealed and the TPA 
amended to ensure 
that a contravention of Part IV of the TPA, or of s 4D of that Act, shall not be 
taken to have been committed by reason of the imposing of conditions in a 
licence, or the inclusion of conditions in a contract, arrangement or 
understanding, that relate to the subject matter of that intellectual property 
statute, so long as those conditions do not result, or are not likely to result, in a 
substantial lessening of competition.346 
The ACCC would also be required to issue guidelines as to the manner in 
which it would enforce these provisions, and a clearance process would be 
available, similar in operation to the ‘letters of comfort’ available under the 
ACCC’s Merger Guidelines.347 
The IPCRC recommendations are open to criticism as they would retain 
perhaps the most uncertain element of the current TPA s 51(3) — whether or not 
a condition ‘relates to’ the IP right in question. Although the proposed ACCC 
guidelines might offer some guidance on this point, a significant degree of 
uncertainty will probably remain until the provisions are judicially considered. 
Given that only one case has considered s 51(3) since 1974, uncertainty as to the 
scope of the ‘relates to’ element could be expected to remain for some time. 
The Australian Government accepted the recommendations of the IPCRC in 
part. In August 2001, the Government announced that TPA ss 46, 46A and 48 
would ‘be treated as per the old subsection 51(3)’348 — that is, that no exemption 
would apply — and that IP licensing would be subject to the other provisions of 
Part IV.349 However, a contravention of the per se prohibitions of TPA ss 45 
(horizontal agreements in restraint of competition), 45A (price-fixing) and 47 
(third-line forcing), or of s 4D (exclusionary provisions) would ‘instead be 
subject to a substantial lessening of competition test.’350 Presumably, the 
Government’s intent is to allow licensors of IP to engage in those otherwise 
prohibited practices, so long as they do not significantly affect competition by 
doing so. 
The amendments required to give effect to the Government response have not 
yet been introduced to Parliament and are unlikely to be introduced before 2007. 
7 Effect of the Proposed Amendments 
The question then is: how will the Government’s proposed amendments affect 
the ability of companies to engage in anti-competitive conduct in relation to the 
IP involved in DRM systems? 
 
346 Ibid 215. 
347 Ibid. See, eg, ACCC, Merger Guidelines: June 1999 (1999) <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/ 
index.phtml/itemId/304397>. 
348 Australian Government, Government Response to Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Recommendations (2001) 12 <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/general/response1.PDF>. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid 11–12. 
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Much will depend on the precise wording of the amendments. The 
Government’s response refers only to ‘a substantial lessening of competition 
test’, which is disappointingly vague. Is the Government referring to: 
• conduct which results in a substantial lessening of competition; 
• conduct which is likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition; 
• conduct which has the purpose of substantially lessening competition; or 
• some combination of the above? 
Nor is it certain in which market the substantial lessening of competition must 
occur. Is it the market for the IP rights themselves, the market for products or 
services produced using those rights or any market at all? 
Even once these questions about the new test are resolved, proving a 
substantial lessening of competition in the context of conditions in the licensing 
of IP rights is likely to be difficult. The test requires a counterfactual analysis, as 
described in Part III(D). The difficulty here will be characterising the state of 
competition without the condition. The owner or licensor of the IP in question 
will almost certainly argue that, if they were not permitted to impose the 
impugned conditions when exploiting their IP, they would not have developed 
the IP in the first place. 
This argument has some force. The creation of IP often requires significant 
investments of time, money and expertise. The ability for owners of IP to license 
it on discriminatory and sometimes anti-competitive terms affords them a degree 
of security and certainty of return, which encourages the investment necessary to 
create the IP. 
If a court accepts that without the ability to impose the impugned conditions, 
the owner or licensor would not have created or licensed the IP at all, the 
substantial lessening of competition test cannot be satisfied. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in proving a substantial lessening of 
competition, the proposed amendments represent an improvement upon the 
current situation. The existing TPA s 51(3) suffers from significant flaws and 
uncertainties which are in dire need of correction. In those cases where a 
substantial lessening of competition can be shown, the availability of the TPA 
Part IV prohibitions will be a useful tool to prevent and deter anti-competitive 
conduct involving IP licenses. 
IV  CONCLUSIONS  
Anti-circumvention laws have the legitimate policy objective of protecting the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders. But, in doing so, they threaten to impede 
competition in high technology markets. The interests of copyright holders must 
be balanced against the need for competition, and, while an appropriate balance 
may be difficult to strike, the current balance is an unsatisfactory one. 
Legislators in many countries appear to have given insufficient consideration 
to the need for competition in markets where DRM is employed. In their desire 
to condemn tools to facilitate copyright infringement, legislators have prohibited 
the production of DRM-interoperable products unless they meet arbitrary and 
     
714 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 30 
     
restrictive conditions. In many cases, it may not be possible to produce or market 
DRM-interoperable products without running afoul of these laws. The result is a 
de facto legislative monopoly for the DRM owner to control the production of 
interoperable products. 
Although the traditional rationale for DRM systems — or at least the one 
publicly espoused by copyright owners — is to prevent copyright infringement, 
DRM systems have given copyright owners a number of collateral benefits. A 
comprehensive right to control or prohibit competition in related markets, such 
as that which is provided by many DRM systems, may be more valuable to DRM 
owners and copyright holders than any associated reduction in the level of 
copyright infringement. 
The US precedents discussed clearly illustrate that some companies are using 
the DMCA not to protect themselves from copyright infringement, but to protect 
themselves from competition. Judicial restraint in interpreting the relevant 
legislation and robust and competition-friendly exceptions to copyright have thus 
far prevented the worst of this abuse. 
The final implementation of the AUSFTA, due on 1 January 2007, will result in 
an anti-circumvention regime whose potential anti-competitive effects exceed 
those of the DMCA, because of small but significant differences in the scope of 
copyright protection between Australia and the US. 
Despite widespread and seemingly anti-competitive behaviour taking place 
using DRM, we are aware of only a few cases in which antitrust claims have 
been raised over such conduct. SCC filed a separate antitrust action against 
Lexmark in the US District Court in North Carolina. It was dismissed on purely 
procedural grounds.351 CHE also raised antitrust issues in a counterclaim against 
StorageTek. Several of those claims were dismissed in summary judgment in 
StorageTek’s favour, and the remainder have yet to be decided.352 The third case 
was the unsuccessful ‘essential facilities’ case against Apple before the French 
competition authority.353 Two more class action lawsuits have been commenced 
against Apple in the US, alleging contraventions of the Sherman Act and 
unlawful tying in the context of Apple’s iTunes and iPod products.354 
There seems to be a great potential for future cases exploring the legality under 
competition law of using DRM to restrict competition, and we suggest that the 
paucity of current cases does not properly reflect the seriousness of the situation. 
Part IV of the TPA might apply in some situations, but its effect will depend 
almost entirely on how the relevant markets are defined in each particular case. 
This in turn will depend heavily on the facts of each particular case and on 
expert evidence on economic issues and consumer behaviour. The uncertain 
scope of the TPA s 51(3) exception may complicate any attempts to establish 
 
351 US rules of civil procedure required that the antitrust claims should have been made as a 
counterclaim in the original action instituted by Lexmark: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure r 
13(a) (2006). The separate action was dismissed without prejudice: Static Control Components 
Inc v Dallas Semiconductor Corporation, 56 Fed R Serv 3d (Callaghan) 307 (D NC, 2003). 
352 Storage Technology Corporation v Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting Ltd, 
No 02-12102-RWZ, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 43690 (D Mass, 2006). 
353 Conseil de la Concurrence, above n 13. 
354 See Tucker v Apple Computer Inc, No 5:06-cv-04457-JW (ND Cal, filed 21 July 2006); 
Charoensak v Apple Computer Inc, No 5:05-cv-00037-JW (ND Cal, 2005, filed 3 January 2005). 
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unlawful exclusive dealing, and jurisdictional issues could prevent the effective 
use of Part IV against foreign corporations. 
Two things are certain: anti-circumvention laws have great potential to be 
abused for anti-competitive purposes and the ability of current laws to effectively 
address such abuse is unclear and unproven. 
